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ABSTRACT 
ASSET EXCHANGES AS A RESTRUCTURING STRATEGY: 
MOTIVES AND VALUATION EFFECTS 
SEPTEMBER 1992 
SUDHIR NANDA, B.A. (Hons.) UNIVERSITY OF DELHI 
P.G.D.M., INDIAN INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT, CALCUTTA 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Directed by: Professor James E. Owers 
This study examines restructuring in which, (i) two firms 
exchange operating units (asset-for-asset exchanges), and (ii) a 
firm divests assets in exchange for an equity stake in the firm 
acquiring the assets (asset-for-stock exchanges). These transactions 
are called asset exchanges, as distinct from divestitures primarily 
for cash. Since liquidity is not the primary consideration, asset 
exchanges are more suitable than sales of assets for cash when 
examining the role of synergy in the divestiture decision. An asset- 
for-stock exchange is similar to a partial merger and creates an 
alternative form of cooperative strategy and organization to mergers 
and joint ventures. 
We do not find evidence of gains to firms in asset-for-asset 
exchanges. While portfolios of divestors and acquirers in asset-for- 
stock exchanges gain, an analysis of matched pairs of firms in each 
transaction reveals that both firms gain only in a third of all 
cases. Overall, an asset-for-stock exchange leads to an increase in 
the combined value of the divestor and the acquirer. The gains in 
v 
dollar value terms are fairly large relative to the gains in 
takeovers. The sharing of gains is related to the percentage of 
stock acquired, appointment by the divestor of directors on the 
acquirer’s board, voting restrictions on stock, the use of cash as a 
part of the consideration and the financial condition of the 
divested unit. 
The results of this study suggest that returns to firms 
undertaking asset exchanges cannot be explained by synergistic 
motives alone and indicates a need to examine other possible motives 
in asset exchanges as well as in other forms of divestitures. 
vi 
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1.1 Objective of this Study 
During the past decade a number of studies have addressed the 
issues relating to the valuation effects of and motives for 
transactions in the market for ‘corporate control’. While there is 
broad agreement regarding the valuation effects, the exact role of 
l 
various factors in this revaluation has not been established. 
The synergy hypothesis as an explanation for merger gains has 
2 
considerable appeal to academics. However, the effects of other 
possible motives cannot be completely separated. Accordingly, we 
3 
cannot reach firm conclusions about the exact process of valuation. 
Studies on sell-offs suggest that these transactions are 
motivated by the objective of sharpening the ‘corporate focus’. This 
is achieved by eliminating businesses that do not offer a good 
strategic fit with the firm’s other activities and through the 
synergistic gains available due to asset recombinations. Though the 
4 
literature suggests that a number of motives could influence the 
divestiture decision, most studies have argued that achieving 
synergies is the driving force in the decision to divest assets. 
A number of press reports accompanying sell-off announcements 
and articles in business publications state that a major motive for 
selling assets is to raise cash.5,6 The finance literature suggests 
that selling assets to raise capital is not a plausible motive and 
should have no valuation effects in an efficient market. This motive 
1 
would imply that imperfections exist in the financial markets. Hite, 
Owers and Rogers (1987) and Linn and Rozeff (1986)7 found a positive 
valuation effect at the announcement of sell-offs. They suggest that 
the positive reaction is due to synergistic gains. However, the 
samples used in the sell-off studies in all likelihood consisted of 
primarily cash transactions. While most studies do not give details 
of the medium of payment, in Hite, Owers and Rogers’ sample most 
transactions involved a cash payment. 
Jain (1985) found that sellers gain at the announcement of a 
sell-off, but the announcement is preceded by a period of 
significant negative abnormal returns. Comparing sell-offs with 
spin-offs, which are non-cash transactions and are preceded by 
positive abnormal returns, he suggests that poorly performing firms 
are more likely to face liquidity problems and sell assets to 
overcome these problems. Alexander, Benson and Kampmeyer (1984) also 
observe negative abnormal returns in the pre-announcement period and 
suggest that the three possible motives (selling non-profitable 
ventures, concentrating on other businesses by becoming less diverse 
and generating cash for other parts of the firm) are associated with 
potentially unfavorable information about management’s perception of 
future cash flows. Hearth and Zaima (1984) find that financially 
strong sellers earn higher abnormal returns than weak sellers. While 
we can accept that a major motive in selling assets is to achieve 
synergies, the current evidence in support of this is less than 
2 
convincing as we cannot reject the existence of liquidity 
considerations driving the sell-off decision. 
This study examines a form of restructuring that has not been 
studied in the past. In these, a firm divests assets in exchange for 
either similar assets or stock in the firm acquiring the divested 
assets. These transactions are called asset exchanges, as distinct 
from divestitures involving a monetary consideration (cash or debt). 
Since these divestitures are not confounded by the existence of cash 
as the primary consideration, they are more suitable for examining 
the existence of synergy as the major motive in the divestiture 
decision. This study will thus provide a sharper focus on the 
motives involved in the decision to divest assets. 
We examine the effect on stock returns around the announcement 
of asset exchanges to make inferences about their valuation impact. 
Since liquidity considerations are not the primary motive in asset 
exchanges, gains to firms at the announcement of these transactions 
will provide support for the synergy hypothesis in divestitures. 
Most studies on divestitures have examined the wealth gains to 
divestors and acquirers separately. It is possible that divestors 
and acquirers in their samples may be derived from different 
transactions, although from the same time period. While the results 
from these studies can be used to make inferences about gains to 
divestors and acquirers, they provide limited evidence about the 
wealth effects of divestitures. For example, it is possible that 
only divestors gain in some transactions and only acquirers gain in 
3 
other transactions. While we may find significant gains to 
portfolios of divestors and acquirers, the gains to one set of firms 
in a transaction might arise due to a transfer of wealth from the 
other party to the transaction. This may mean that the divestiture 
does not lead to the creation of wealth. While Bradley, Desai and 
Kim (1988) provide such evidence on gains from tender offers, the 
divestiture literature has not examined this issue as yet. 
In addition to the wealth effects for divestors and acquirers in 
asset exchanges, we examine if such exchanges lead to a net increase 
in wealth in each transaction. Gains to portfolios of matched pairs 
of firms involved in each transaction will provide stronger support 
for synergy being the primary motive in asset exchanges and 
divestitures. 
Further, we examine some factors that might provide an 
understanding of characteristics of divestors and acquirers that 
gain or lose in asset exchanges. In addition to percentage returns, 
we also provide evidence on the wealth impact in dollar terms. 
The organizational form resulting from an asset-for-stock 
exchange could be best described as a partial merger. This can be 
looked upon as an alternative form of organization or cooperative 
strategy to mergers and joint ventures. The advantages of this form 
over merging or forming a joint venture are discussed and an 
empirical examination to explain some motives for this exchange is 
presented. 
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1.2 Vhat are Asset Exchanges? 
Divestitures have formed between 35% to 40% of all Mergers and 
Acquisitions in the 1980’s (Weston, Chung and Hoag, pp. 224). Since 
a number of restructuring transactions are included under the 
umbrella of divestitures, we provide a brief review to distinguish 
3 
these from asset exchanges." All divestitures lead to the separation 
of a part of the firm’s operations. 
Spin-offs are normally associated with divestitures of 
subsidiaries in which the parent holds at least 80% of the equity. 
In a spin-off, shares in the subsidiary are distributed on a pro- 
9 
rata basis to the parent’s stockholders. The net result is the 
creation of two public corporations with the same set of 
stockholders having the same proportional ownership in the two 
firms. The stock is distributed as a dividend and the transaction is 
usually tax-free to the stockholders. 
A related transaction is an equity carve-out. In this, part of a 
wholly owned subsidiary’s shares are offered to the public, 
resulting in an infusion of cash without loss of control. This 
transaction is thus analogous to an Initial Public Offering of the 
subsidiary’s stock. 
Other transactions that can result in a firm divesting a 
division are Leveraged Buy-outs and Management Buy-outs. A Leveraged 
Buy-out divestiture is financed by a high percentage of debt and in 
most cases leads to the firm formed by acquiring the divested unit 
going private. A Management Buy-out is led by the firm’s incumbent 
5 
management and also leads to the firm going private. These two 
transactions need not involve complete firms and can be used to 
divest a part of the firm. A voluntary Liquidation, though not 
technically a divestiture, results in a firm selling all its assets 
and ceasing to exist as a corporate entity after the transaction is 
complete. 
Our focus is on a subset of divestitures that are generally 
classified as Sell-offs. In these transactions firms divest a part 
of their operations, usually in return for cash. Unlike some 
transactions listed above, these do not result in the buyer going 
private. Control over the divested unit passes on to a different 
corporate entity which usually has a different set of stockholders 
and managers from the seller. From the buyer’s perspective this can 
be viewed as a partial merger. 
In this study, we examine divestitures that are similar to sell- 
offs but do not involve cash as the primary consideration. We call 
these transactions asset exchanges. In these transactions the 
consideration for the divested asset is either assets of the other 
firm, stock or a reduction in debt. Sometimes a partial cash 
consideration is involved. If these transactions meet certain 
conditions the exchange becomes a tax-free reorganization. An 
examination of such transactions suggests the following three 
subdivisions: 
6 
1.2.1 Asset-for-Asset Exchanges 
In these the firms exchange operating units with each other. The 
most commonly stated motives are to achieve operating efficiencies 
or synergies, to realign businesses, specialize in certain 
businesses or concentrate operations in a geographic area. 
A recent example is the exchange of General Electric’s consumer 
electronics business with Thomson S.A.’s medical gear business in 
1987. General Electric was a leader in the medical equipment 
business and according to its chairman John Welch, Jr., Thomson’s 
operations were ‘an excellent fit’ in a business GE viewed as its 
fastest growing segment. The policy of focusing on businesses in 
which GE could be a leader led them to divest the consumer 
electronics business which was not profitable and would have taken 
2-3 years before it could be turned around. Thomson was a big name 
in consumer electronics worldwide and this exchange provided them an 
opportunity to enter the U.S. market. 
Another circumstance in which this arrangement is often observed 
is in divesting operations in one country in exchange for operations 
in another country. This can be a useful technique to move out of a 
country that does not allow foreign businesses to shut down their 
operations easily. 
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1.2.2 Asset-for-Stock Exchanges 
These can be divided into two categories. 
1.2.2.1 Divesting Assets in Exchange for Stock in the Firm that is 
Acquiring the Assets 
Usually the divested business is the major business of the 
acquirer and is not the principal business of the divestor. 
Typically the divestor acquires a 5%-30% stake and thereby becomes 
the largest stockholder in the firm acquiring the assets. In some 
cases the stock is non-voting or a standstill agreement is reached 
between the firms. In addition, the divestor sometimes appoints 
directors on the board of the acquirer. Some of the stated motives 
for this transaction are: 
(1) Filling a hole in the acquirer’s product offering. 
(2) Creating ‘pure plays’, so that the businesses are valued 
separately. 
(3) Increasing production capacity to meet demand. 
(4) Fostering cooperation between the firms and expanding in a 
business in which the acquirer is already operating. 
In 1985, IBM acquired a 16% stake in MCI Communications Corp. in 
exchange for its Satellite Business Systems Unit, which was a 
communications carrier. It was felt that as a result of this 
acquisition MCI will be able to utilize the satellite systems better 
and provide competition to AT&T. Satellite Business Systems (SBS) 
had been losing heavily and according to IBM’s Vice Chairman Paul 
Rizzo the relationship did not mean that MCI could dip into IBM’s 
8 
‘deep pockets’ at will. But IBM was more willing to invest further 
in MCI than in SBS, which would need considerable further investment 
if it were to stand alone. It was felt that the transaction would 
allow IBM a bigger stake in the communications industry together 
with its previous acquisition of Rolm and other communications 
related ventures. On the day of the announcement, without adjusting 
for the movement in the market, MCI’s stock gained 18.75% and IBM 
gained 0.93%. MCI’s major competitors lost, with AT&T’s stock price 
dropping by 2.59% and GTE Corp. losing 2.93%. 
A reading of the news reports suggests that achieving synergies 
is the motive in such transactions. The focus of this study is on 
this form of an asset-for-stock exchange. 
We will henceforth call the firm divesting assets the divestor, 
and the firm acquiring assets the acquirer. 
1.2.2.2 Exchange of Assets in Return for Own Stock 
In 1980, following Chris-Craft’s unsuccessful takeover attempt, 
Fox Films offered to exchange assets in return for Fox’s stock. A 
number of similar transactions were structured to take advantage of 
tax savings allowed by certain provisions in the tax laws. Recent 
court decisions have resulted in the elimination of any tax savings 
as a result of this transaction. A large proportion of these 
transactions seem to be cases of Greenmail. These exchanges are the 
subject of a separate study. 
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1.2.3 Asset-for-Debt Exchanges 
Most of these were carried out by real estate firms. The typical 
firm in this category had problems in meeting its debt obligations 
and was heading towards bankruptcy. The exchange is usually carried 
out with a bank, which gets some real estate in return for reducing 
the firm’s debt obligation to the bank. In most cases the swap is 
first suggested when a loan agreement is renegotiated. After that 
the firm typically carries out a series of swaps over a period of 
1-2 years. Some exchanges are negotiated while others are conducted 
through a process of bidding by a number of creditors. These 
exchanges are mostly forced by liquidity problems and the need to 
reduce the firm’s debt. We do not examine these exchanges in this 
study, due to a very small number of transactions. 
1.3 Organization of the Dissertation 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. 
Chapter 2 reviews the sell-off literature. Motivated primarily by 
the discussion in Chapter 2 and the unexplained issues in the 
literature, hypotheses for this study are proposed in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 4 explains the sample selection procedure, characteristics 
of the sample and the methodology. The results for Asset-for-Asset 
Exchanges are presented in Chapter 5 and those for Asset-for-Stock 
Exchanges in Chapter 6. Conclusions and Extensions to this study are 
discussed in Chapter 7. The Appendix contains a note on some tax and 
accounting implications of asset exchanges. 
10 
Endnotes 
1. Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988) 
review the merger literature. 
2. Dennis and McConnell 
Kim (1983, 1988) 
(1986), Asquith (1983), Bradley, Desai and 
3. Roll (1988) and Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988) review the 
evidence on the motives for mergers. 
4. Linn and Rozeff (1986) review the sell-off literature. 
5. See for example, ‘Divestitures: Antidote to Merger Mania,’ 
Business Horizons, Nov./Dec. 1987. Clark E. Chastain quotes, "The 
need for cash causes many firms to part with organizational 
elements, even profitable ones." 
6. In our view this might be particularly true in the 1980’s when 
divestitures often followed leveraged buyouts. Most of the 
studies quoted here were based on samples prior to 1982. 
7. Hite, Owers and Rogers’ definition of synergies is the same as 
that of Bradley, Desai and Kim (1983). The gains can arise from 
more efficient management of assets, economies of scale, improved 
production techniques, combination of complementary resources, 
increased market power and the redeployment of assets to more 
profitable uses. The critical aspect is that the increase in 
value derives from the transfer of control over resources. Linn 
and Rozeff (1986) conclude that divestors gain because the 
divested assets are worth more to someone else than to the 
current owner and also due to removing the diseconomies 
associated with the continued presence of the divested unit. 
8. See Weston, Chung and Hoag, 1990, Mergers, Restructuring and 
Corporate Control for a review of the literature on these 
transactions. 
9. At least 80% of the shares in the subsidiary must be distributed 




During the 1980’s a number of researchers have studied the 
wealth effects of divestitures and the motives behind these 
transactions. The major focus of these studies has been on sell- 
offs, spin-offs and liquidations. 
Most authors suggest that these transactions are motivated by 
the aim of sharpening the ‘corporate focus’ by eliminating 
businesses that do not offer a good strategic fit with the other 
activities of the firm. Most of the literature argues that 
divestitures are driven by synergistic motives. 
Asset Exchanges resemble sell-offs, with the difference being 
that the consideration for the divested asset is not cash. A study 
of these non-cash exchanges can help resolve some contradictions in 
the empirical evidence on sell-offs for cash, which is discussed in 
this section. 
2.1 Motives for Sell-offs 
The following possible motives for sell-offs have been 
i 
identified in the literature: 
1. Sell-offs are a means of raising capital. 
2. Sell-offs are undertaken to repay debt, strengthen the balance 
sheet and move towards an optimal capital structure. This seems 
to be an expensive way to reduce a firm’s debt ratio. The real 
cause could be that the seller believes that it can obtain a 
good price for the asset being divested. The fact that newly 
12 
liquid assets are used to bring down debt is an incidental 
effect and should not be expected to increase the stock’s value. 
However, Jain (1985) suggests that such sell-offs should have a 
positive impact on stock prices if the sale is not anticipated. 
His view is that a firm nearing bankruptcy will find it 
difficult to raise funds even with collateralized financing 
since strict enforcement of collateral is not always possible 
[Warner (1977)]. 
3. The seller wishes to get out of a capital intensive industry. 
4. The divested unit is losing money. 
Linn and Rozeff (and others) have argued that a sell-off is not 
an optimal response to the motives discussed above. In an efficient 
market an unprofitable unit’s performance should already be 
reflected in its stock price. This implies that if a unit is sold 
for its value there should be no stock price reaction. But if the 
buyer can restore the unit to profitability, take advantage of some 
other features like gains from economies of scale, or has an 
advantage in monitoring and controlling the management of the 
divested unit, real gains could be made. From the seller’s point of 
view, divesting a money-losing division will reduce the negative 
effects due to its interfering with the other operations of the 
firm. This should allow the sellers to concentrate on areas they 
know best and should result in an increase in the stock price. Most 
authors conclude that this is the only motive that makes economic 
sense and the sale should result in a gain to both parties. In this 
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case the sell-off becomes a mechanism for transferring assets to 
higher valued uses. Thus, the fifth possible motive could be stated 
2,3 
as: 
5. The seller wishes to divest units that are unrelated to the 
other operations and do not fit in with its strategic plans, and 
the divested unit is worth more as a part of another firm than 
as a part of the present organization. 
2.2 Previous Empirical Work 
A summary of some results of previous studies for divestors and 
acquirers in sell-offs is given in Table 2.1. Most studies document 
a significant l%-2.33% gain to sellers. However, this result is not 
uniform across all studies. Alexander, Benson and Kampmeyer (ABK) 
report insignificant returns and Jain reports significant excess 
returns of magnitude less than 1% over a five-day period. ABK’s and 
Jain’s results may be different from others due to the possibility 
that their sample selection procedure favors small sell-offs. 
Most authors (Rosenfeld; Klein; Hite, Owers and Rogers, and Linn 
and Rozeff) also find evidence of an abnormal return of l%-3% during 
the month prior to the announcement. The two exceptions are Jain and 
ABK who document negative returns in this period. Over a longer 
interval prior to the sell-off, Hite, Owers and Rogers (1987) also 
report negative returns, which are more negative for unsuccessful 
sellers. ABK’s explanation is that the motives for selling assets 
(need cash to maintain solvency, the admission that a particular 
project was unprofitable or to concentrate on other parts of the 
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business by becoming less diverse) are associated with unfavorable 
information about management’s perceptions regarding future cash 
flows. In case this ‘bad news’ is released with the announcement of 
a sale, the effect of the announcement will be dampened. Otherwise 
the ‘bad news’ will be released prior to the news of the 
divestiture, resulting in negative excess returns in the pre- 
announcement period. They find evidence of negative excess returns 
during days -30 to +30, except for the two-day announcement period. 
Their evidence also suggests that only the pre-announcement period 
decline was significant. 
Jain (1985) observed small positive returns to sellers during 
the announcement period, but found that sellers have negative 
abnormal returns over various intervals prior to the announcement of 
a sale. He also found evidence of negative abnormal returns in the 
post-announcement period though these were not significant. In their 
study on spin-offs. Miles and Rosenfeld (1983) found that firms earn 
significant positive abnormal returns in the pre-event period. Since 
spin-offs also result in gains at the announcement of the 
transaction and are not motivated by liquidity considerations, Jain 
argues that poorly performing firms are more likely to face 
liquidity problems and therefore engage in sell-offs to overcome 
these problems. In his sample, the sellers also performed poorly in 
the post-event period. If sell-offs are motivated by synergistic 
considerations, the pattern of returns in the pre- and post- 
4 
announcement periods needs a more complete explanation. 
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Rosenfeld (1984) also observed gains to stockholders at the 
announcement of a sell-off. However, he found positive pre¬ 
announcement period returns. He subdivided his sample based on 
Standard & Poor’s quality rating, and observed a strong positive 
relationship between returns and the quality rating. This result 
suggests that more favorable news is being released for the high 
quality firms. Inspite of a similar methodology his results differ 
from ABK’s, suggesting that ABK’s sample had a disproportionate 
number of minor sell-offs and/or firms facing financial 
difficulties. The major difference between their sample selection 
procedure was Rosenfeld’s restriction that the selling price of the 
divested unit be at least 10% of the market value of the divestor’s 
equity. In fact, most of his results could be sample sensitive due 
to the small sample size. 
We can compare asset sales, which are partial acquisitions from 
the buyer’s viewpoint, with mergers. The merger literature [Dennis 
and McConnell (1986), Asquith (1983), and Dodd (1980)] finds that 
target stockholders gain significantly in mergers. The acquiring 
firm’s stockholders also gain, though the gains are much smaller 
than those to targets. For successful targets, Dodd finds abnormal 
returns of 13.41% (z=23.80) and Asquith finds abnormal returns of 
6.20% (z=23.07). For unsuccessful targets, the comparable returns 
were 12.73% (z=19.08) reported by Dodd and 7.00% (z=12.83) reported 
by Asquith. 
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Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988) review the evidence on 
tender offers during the period 1960-85. The evidence shows that 
targets gain, with the average premium paid in successful tender 
offers being 16% in the 1960’s, 35% in the 1970’s and 30% in the 
1980’s. Over the period 1960-85, the announcement period gains to 
bidders were between l%-2%. Interestingly, there was a secular 
decline in bidder returns, which were positive in the 1960’s and 
1970’s but negative insignificant in the 1980’s. The probable cause 
of this secular decline in bidder returns is the increased 
competition among bidders. 
Bradley, Desai and Kim (1983) offer two hypotheses to explain 
the motivation for interfirm tender offers: 
1. Information hypothesis- Targets are undervalued by the market 
because investors are not fully informed about future cash 
flows. For this reason an offer by another firm conveys 
information about underpricing. 
2. Synergy hypothesis- Productive gains can be realized only by 
the transfer of assets from their current use to the buyer’s 
control. For bids motivated by synergy, the cancellation of a 
bid will signal the loss of potential gains and cancel the 
initial price response unless another bidder appears. 
Bradley, Desai and Kim argue that both hypotheses predict gains 
to the seller at the bid announcement, but a different price 
response if the bid fails. The information hypothesis does not 
require the transfer of ownership to maintain the initial price 
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response, while the synergy hypothesis requires transfer of 
ownership for the revaluation to be maintained. Their findings for 
completed and terminated tender offers support the synergy 
hypothesis. 
Hite, Owers and Rogers (1987) examine the returns separately for 
successful and unsuccessful sell-offs, and find that firms 
completing a sale of assets experience a slightly higher return at 
announcement than firms not completing a sale (1.66% versus 1.41%). 
For successful sellers the combined return at announcement and 
completion averages 2.28%. Unsuccessful sellers experience positive 
abnormal returns at announcement and negative abnormal returns at 
termination. The sum of the two is 0.46%, which is statistically 
insignificant. Gains made by sellers were found to be less than 
those made by targets in mergers. In terminated offers, permanent 
revaluation is maintained only by the subset of firms that receive a 
subsequent offer. These revaluations are consistent with the synergy 
hypothesis, which says that the transfer of assets to the bidder 
generates real productive gains. In case of unsuccessful sellers not 
receiving a subsequent offer, Linn and Rozeff (1986) question why 
the market seems to rule out the possibility of a sale in the 
future. 
If the buyer’s operations fit with the acquired asset such that 
the unit is worth far more to the buyer than to the seller then the 
market may expect significant gains to the buyer. In this case the 
buyer’s stock price will also rise at the announcement of a 
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divestiture. Hite, Owers and Rogers document a significant 0.83% 
gain to buyers in sell-offs, which is lower than that to sellers. 
Unsuccessful buyers had small abnormal returns and a higher number 
of negative observations than others. Jain also documents a positive 
but insignificant abnormal return to buyers. 
Rosenfeld (1984) also examined the division of gains between 
buyers and sellers. In contrast to the other studies and the merger 
literature, he found identical gains to buyers and sellers in sell- 
offs. This evidence suggests that both firms have unique resources 
that earn positive economic rents when combined with the assets of 
the other firm. Further, he documents similar cumulative returns 
over all comparison intervals for both buyers and sellers. Over days 
-30 to +30, sellers had cumulative returns of 6.99% as compared to 
7.06% for buyers. Two distinguishing characteristics of Rosenfeld’s 
study are a small sample and large divestitures. Rosenfeld does not 
give any data on the relative sizes of buyers and sellers. However, 
in Hite, Owers and Rogers’ sample, buyers and sellers had the same 
median size. 
Two possible reasons for expecting a more positive wealth effect 
for bidders in sell-offs as compared to mergers are a competitive 
bidder market in mergers, and the possibility that a desire for 
quick cash on part of the seller may enable bidders in sell-offs to 
capture a higher portion of the gains. In view of this, it is 
surprising that the evidence in most studies shows that bidders in 
sell-offs do not capture a larger portion of the gains. 
19 
Sicherman and Pettway (1987) focus on the wealth effects for 
buying firm’s stockholders. Since typically only one buyer actively 
negotiates to purchase assets in divestitures, the market may not be 
perfectly competitive and economic rents may be earned by buyers. 
These rents are hypothesized to depend upon: 
1. Relatedness of the buyer and the divested assets. 
2. Level of managerial stock ownership in the acquirer. Managers 
may acquire unrelated assets to diversify employment risk. 
Conversely, a manager whose wealth is tied to share 
performance may be induced to acquire related assets. 
3. Financial condition of the divestor. Buying from a financially 
distressed firm may allow the acquirer to extract a higher 
portion of gains. 
Measuring relatedness using SIC codes, Sicherman and Pettway 
find that related buyers had a 3.227% gain during the 60 days around 
the announcement date as against a 0.748% loss (not significant) for 
unrelated buyers. They also observed that firms acquiring related 
divested assets are more likely to have a higher proportion of 
inside ownership. Examining the joint effects of relatedness and 
financial condition, they find that cumulative abnormal returns for 
acquiring firms purchasing related assets from strong sellers were 
5.452% higher than for firms purchasing unrelated assets from strong 
sellers, suggesting an agency conflict in the decision to acquire 
unrelated assets. However, they do not find conclusive evidence in 
support of the fact that purchasing from financially weak firms 
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yields significant gains and also suggest that further work on 
product line relatedness needs to be done to distinguish profitable 
asset acquisitions. 
Hearth and Zaima (1984) conclude that the stronger the financial 
position of the seller the larger is the excess return to the 
seller’s stockholders. One reason for this could be the better 
negotiating power of strong sellers. Another possibility that has 
not been examined is that the motives of strong and weak sellers may 
be different. For example, divestitures by strong sellers may be 
undertaken to achieve synergies and those by weak sellers may be 
driven by the need to raise cash. A test of whether weak sellers 
state that their motive for divesting is to raise cash would help 
clarify this issue. If strong sellers are in a better negotiating 
position, we expect that bidders who buy from strong sellers will 
have smaller abnormal returns than bidders buying from weak sellers. 
However, Sicherman and Pettway did not find any evidence to support 
this hypothesis. By matching pairs of buyers and sellers one could 
examine how the gains are shared and also confirm if buying from 
weak sellers has any additional benefit. 
Sicherman and Pettway use downgrades by Moody’s and/or Standard 
8 Poor’s to classify the strength of the seller, while Hearth and 
Zaima classified sellers using Standard 8 Poor’s stock ranking. 
Though this ranking is influenced by measures of profitability and 
financial strength, a more direct measure like the earnings or cash 
flow performance of the divestor may provide stronger conclusions. 
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Another check would be to stratify firms by those having positive or 
negative abnormal returns in the pre-announcement period. 
Hearth and Zaima also find that larger divestitures exhibit a 
larger positive excess return and that the market reaction to the 
publicly stated reason for divesting was tenuous. However, smaller 
divestitures stated ‘need to concentrate on major lines of 
operations’ as the reason more often than larger ones. 
To explain the inconsistent results for sellers (in terms of 
small positive, large positive and small negative abnormal returns) 
in previous studies, Klein (1986) tries to isolate factors behind 
the differences in price movements. She examines: 
1. The size of the divestiture. 
2. Whether the sale price is announced at the time the decision 
to divest is announced. 
Klein documents a positive relationship between the size of the 
divestiture and the price response. Further, firms that announced a 
selling price with the decision to divest experienced a gain of 
2.41%, but those not providing a price showed virtually no movement. 
Revelation of price is explained as a means of conveying favorable 
information about the value of the assets and the firm. This 
information could be that the value of assets increases on transfer 
or that the firm is selling assets that are undervalued by the 
market. But undervaluation is not consistent with market efficiency. 
She also finds that subsequent price disclosure after the initial 
announcement produces insignificant positive returns. 
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Linn and Rozeff give the following possible explanations for her 
results: 
1. Companies choose not to announce the selling price when they 
are unable to obtain a price that exceeds the unit’s worth to 
the seller. Why managers should do this does not seem to have 
an explanation. 
2. The sale price is a proxy for some other variable, say for 
example the motive. 
Linn and Rozeff’s results on the joint effects of disclosure of 
a motive and of transaction price on the seller’s stock price are 
given in Table 2.2. They conclude that both motive and price play a 
role. Differences in returns between strong and weak sellers could 
possibly be explained by the existence of information effects. For 
example, strong sellers may disclose the transaction price more 
often than weak sellers. 
A number of studies have compared the wealth effects of sell- 
offs with spin-offs [ABK, Jain, Rosenfeld]. Unlike spin-offs, sell- 
offs bring in liquid resources and also lead to a change in the 
ownership of assets. Spin-offs are characterized by a change in 
control and are tax-free reorganizations. Both decisions could 
emanate from a parent’s desire to specialize in a limited set of 
activities. These studies find a smaller abnormal return in case of 
sell-offs as compared to spin-offs. Firms spinning-off units had 
positive abnormal returns in the period prior to the announcement as 
compared to the negative returns in case of sale of assets, 
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suggesting that firms selling assets had been performing poorly and 
the sale was a means to obtain liquid assets. The different tax 
treatment for the two types of divestitures has not been considered 
in these comparisons. 
Tehranian, Travlos and Waegelein (1987) find that sell-off 
decisions made by firms employing long-term compensation plans were 
viewed by the market as more likely to be compatible with 
shareholders’ interests. Hirschey and Zaima (1989) find a highly 
positive market reaction to sell-offs by firms having insider net- 
buy activity in the six months preceding the announcement of a sell- 
off. This positive effect is less evident in firms displaying 
insider net-sell activity. Also, the market reaction is more 
favorable to sell-offs by closely held firms as compared to widely 
held firms. Looking at the interaction of the two variables under 
study, the reaction runs from very favorable for insider net- 




1. See Linn and Rozeff (1986). 
2. Other possible reasons for sell-offs include the following: 
(i) to relax regulatory constraints, (ii) to renegotiate labor 
contracts, (iii) to improve reported profits, (iv) to manipulate 
earnings for tax/political reasons, (v) to facilitate mergers, 
(vi) to avoid bankruptcy and default on loans, (vii) to avoid 
being taken over. 
3. An asset-for-stock exchange could be used as a takeover defense, 
resulting from having a friendly firm as the major stockholder. 
4. Poor performance by a divested unit will affect a firm’s returns. 
This effect will be most prominent in case a poorly performing 
divested unit forms a larger proportion of the pre-divestiture 
firm’s total assets. In that case, it is possible that negative 
pre-announcement period returns were observed by authors whose 
sample had a higher proportion of small firms. 
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Table 2.1 
Summary of past empirical findings on valuation effects for 
divestors and acquirers in selloffs. 
Author(s) Days Avg. CAR’s Period Sample Size 
DIVESTORS 
Alexander, Benson 
and Kampmeyer (1984) 
-1,0 0. 17X 
(0.67) 
1964-73 53 





Klein (1986) 0 1 . 1 2X 
(2.83) 
1970-79 202 
Linn & Rozeff (1984) -1,0 1 . 45X 
(5.45) 
1977-82 77 
Jain (1985) -5,-1 0.70% 
(4.04) 
1976-78 1107 





















Successful -1,0 0.83% 
(z=2.25) 
1963-81 51 
Unsuccessf u1 -1,0 0.36% 
(z = 0.44) 
1963-81 54 
Sicherman and 
Pettway ( 1987) -30,+30 0.589% 
(0.489) 
1983-85 147 




Results for the joint effects of disclosure of motive and 
transaction price in Linn and Rozeff’s study. 
Price announced Motive announced 
YES NO 
YES 3.92% 2.30% 




3.1 Motivation for this Study’s Hypotheses 
Most of this section draws on the sell-off literature discussed 
earlier. In addition, asset-for-stock exchanges bear a number of 
similarities to mergers and joint ventures and we draw upon that 
literature as well. We can draw a contrast between divestitures and 
asset exchanges because of differences in the form of consideration. 
In this section we briefly review some issues that have not been 
completely explained in the current divestiture literature and use 
them to develop our hypotheses. We discuss the motives for each type 
of asset exchange and specific hypotheses in the next section. 
The sell-off literature looks at two broad motives. The first 
suggests that sell-offs are forced by the need to sell unprofitable 
units and raise cash. The other possible motive is to achieve 
synergies by removing unrelated operations. While a number of 
authors have argued that achieving synergies is the only plausible 
motive, the samples used by them cannot provide conclusive evidence 
in favor of this motive as the sell-offs examined by them were in 
i 
all likelihood all cash transactions. We also know from the 
literature that a large percentage of press reports on sell-offs 
2 
mention that the unit was being sold to raise cash. Only Hite, 
Owers and Rogers test for a particular motive and provide evidence 
favoring the synergy hypothesis over the information hypothesis. 
Similarly, in their study on spin-offs, Hite and Owers (1983) 
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document higher returns if the stated motive for the spin-off was 
specialization. Our sample consists of exchanges of assets for 
assets or for stock, which could not be primarily motivated by the 
desire to raise cash. An examination of asset exchanges will provide 
us with stronger evidence about the existence of synergy as a motive 
in the sell-off decision and its valuation effects. 
An area of disagreement in the studies cited earlier is the 
pre-announcement period returns to sellers. The evidence that 
sellers perform poorly in this period is at best inconclusive. We 
suggest that the seller’s motive might be related to its performance 
and that there is a higher probability that weak sellers are 
motivated by liquidity considerations as compared to strong sellers. 
Since the medium of payment in asset exchanges is primarily non¬ 
cash, we expect a more positive pre-announcement period return than 
has been observed in case of sell-offs. 
3 4 
The merger literature has documented gains to both bidders and 
targets, with targets having much higher returns. However, the 
dollar gains have been found to be more equally divided between 
bidder and target stockholders. A less competitive bidder market, 
and a possible desire for quick cash on part of the seller suggests 
that buyers in sell-offs should capture a higher portion of the 
gains. However, only Rosenfeld documents equal returns to sellers 
and buyers during a sixty-day interval around the announcement date. 
A more appropriate way to examine the division of gains is to study 
returns to matched pairs of bidders and sellers and also compute the 
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gains in terms of dollar values. We expect that there is potential 
for a ‘mutuality of synergy’ in asset exchanges and a more equal 
sharing of gains is expected in our sample. If firms in asset-for- 
asset and asset-for-stock exchanges acquire related assets, then 
gains to acquiring firms in our sample should be higher than for 
cash divestitures. Such a result will provide stronger evidence to 
support the higher benefits from related acquisitions and the 
synergy motive. A matched pair analysis of division of gains will 
also allow us to verify if purchasing assets from weak sellers is 
advantageous, an issue that has not been completely resolved. 
Compared to sales of assets for cash, the possibility of wealth 
expropriation from bondholders is lower in an asset-for-asset or an 
asset-for-stock exchange. 
3.2 Hypotheses for Asset Exchanges 
Having outlined some of the major unresolved issues in the sell- 
off literature, we now look at some motives for each of the two 
transactions being examined and specify testable hypotheses and 
expected results. 
3.2.1 Hypotheses for Asset-for-Asset Exchanges 
Since neither cash nor stock are the major consideration, we 
argue that asset-for-asset exchanges are carried out because both 
firms expect to put the assets to better use than at present. 
Davis (1984) suggests that these trades will be most likely in 
situations where two firms are competing in the same business and 
the same market and wish to: 
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1. Increase their concentration in separate businesses. 
2. Serve separate markets rather than compete directly. 
3. Balance their levels of concentration across various 
markets. 
As product lives become shorter and the rate of technological 
innovation accelerates, an asset-for-asset exchange may be a means 
of entering or strengthening businesses that may be of long term 
strategic importance. This transaction may also achieve some of the 
objectives mentioned by Davis. Coyne and Wright (1986) call these 
exchanges ‘strategic trades’, and argue that these trades will take 
place only if each firm values the other firm’s assets more than its 
own. Transaction costs will also be lower due to combining selling 
and buying in one transaction. 
We hypothesize: 
1. Both firms involved in an asset-for-asset exchange will gain 
at the announcement of an exchange. If synergy5 is the 
driving force behind gains to stockholders in divestitures, 
6 7 
we expect to find larger ’ gains in asset exchanges than in 
cash sales. 
This will provide further support in favor of Hite, Owers and 
Rogers’ evidence that sell-offs are motivated by synergistic gains. 
If exchanging assets does not result in any gains to stockholders, 
one could say that exchanges are a zero-sum game and also suggest 
that asset exchanges and sell-offs are driven by motives other than 
removing a ‘lack of fit’ or achieving synergies. A non-positive 
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reaction will also suggest that transfer of control does not have 
economic consequences in case of asset divestitures. 
2. If asset-for-asset exchanges are motivated by synergistic 
considerations, portfolios of matched pairs of firms in each 
transaction should gain at announcement. We also expect a 
non-dominating partition of gains between the two firms. 
g 
A more equal sharing of gains than has been observed in cash 
sales will also provide stronger support for synergy being a primary 
motive in divestitures. 
We expect the acquired unit to be related to some operations of 
the acquiring firm. 
3. In the subsample of related acquisitions, the firms are 
expected to have higher abnormal returns at announcement 
than in the subsample of unrelated acquisitions. Firms 
divesting unrelated units are expected to have higher 
returns. 
Evidence of higher returns to related acquisitions will add to 
the evidence documented by Sicherman and Pettway on combination of 
related assets and to the evidence on synergy being a motive in the 
divestiture decision. 
3.2.2 Hypotheses for Asset-for-Stock Exchanges 
We argue that these transactions are also motivated by the 
desire to achieve synergistic gains and that this form of 
organization may sometimes be more efficient than a complete merger. 
The business recombination resulting from an asset-for-stock 
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exchange leads to specialization in different activities while still 
allowing both firms a fair degree of autonomy. In fact these 
transactions can be looked upon as ‘partial mergers’. 
Salter and Weinhold (1988) evaluate various forms of takeovers 
and argue that tender offers tend to lead to a one shot improvement 
in the financing and organization of the surviving firm, leading to 
higher but not increasing returns. They suggest that long term value 
is created by recombining separate businesses into a more 
competitive entity. Further, this strategy is rarely available to 
firms pursuing hostile tender offers or to financial entrepreneurs 
with limited operating experience. Financial entrepreneurs can only 
act as catalysts to get a value creation process started. 
They identify four principal sources of value creation in 
takeovers: Refinancing assets; renegotiating contracts; 
reconfiguring assets (which covers unraveling past strategic 
mistakes or divesting businesses which have no synergy with each 
other or are worth more to others than to the firm) and recombining 
businesses, which arises through mergers and acquisitions. 
In their view, in order to exploit benefits from reconfiguring 
businesses through divestitures or product line acquisitions, firms 
often need to recombine the operating businesses into a new set of 
organizational relationships comprised of reporting structures and 
coordinating mechanisms. In their analysis this resource and 
coordination restructuring is the agenda of say the IBM/Rolm/MCI 
partial mergers. They argue that this recombining of businesses will 
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lead to increased asset utilization and bureaucratic efficiency and 
is sustainable over time as it affects the capacity of the core 
businesses to respond and adapt to a dynamic competitive 
environment. Due to its dependence on managerial cooperation this 
strategy may not be available to hostile takeovers. 
A hostile takeover can create value for both the selling and the 
bidding firm’s stockholders, with the seller receiving the lion’s 
share of the gains in an auction process. But when strategies are 
aimed at gaining a unique competitive advantage from recombining 
businesses into new entities, negotiated transactions improve the 
chances of the bidder capturing a higher portion of the gains than 
in hostile takeovers. 
This cooperative strategy can be seen as creating a trade-off 
between the need for unilateral control and for resources. The firm 
reduces its control over certain parts of its operations in exchange 
for resources or control over other parts of its operations. 
3.2.2.1 Comparison with Mergers and Joint Ventures 
Two related strategies are joint ventures and mergers. Joint 
ventures allow firms to maintain corporate autonomy while realizing 
gains from cooperation on a specific project. Unlike mergers, where 
the buyer can impose its own goals on the seller, in a joint venture 
control is shared and strategies are developed in cooperation. 
Evidence by Harrigan (1986) shows that a high percentage of joint 
ventures do not survive or are unsuccessful. This suggests that a 
merger would be preferred over a joint venture. But in certain 
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circumstances a merger may not be desirable/feasible, especially 
when a target is a multi-product firm containing lines that are not 
compatible with the acquirer’s strategy or the target is not 
interested in a merger. In some cases forcing a merger may mean loss 
9 
of the target’s managerial resources. However, if one firm is in a 
single line of business, a joint venture may not be possible and nor 
will it be desirable due to conflicting interests of the partners. 
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Like joint ventures, an asset-for-stock exchange may take place 
only in unique circumstances, e.g. , if one firm specializes/controls 
a unique resource. This strategy can be used to obtain complementary 
technologies especially when the time lag in product introduction 
needs to be reduced. 
Compared to mergers, asset-for-stock exchanges allow the firm 
acquiring the stock to limit its financial commitment and also 
allows the other firm more autonomy. Joint ventures often run into 
antitrust problems. Other problems could arise due to the 
unwillingness of parents to share information and the loss of 
11 
autonomy and control for the venture due to having two parents. A 
large number of joint ventures become casualties when firms believe 
that the bargain is one sided and favors one partner. Harrigan 
(1986) suggests that one solution to the problem may be that parents 
place all their activities in one industry into the venture 
12 
organization. We suggest that asset-for-stock exchanges lead to the 
formation of an organization which allows firms to concentrate in 
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their specializations, and remain autonomous while attaining the 
benefits from cooperation and pooling of resources. 
Some accounting implications make an asset-for-stock exchange 
advantageous as compared to a merger. If the target firm sells at a 
high P/E multiple, a merger will lead to the creation of substantial 
goodwill, which implies dilution of Earnings Per Share for the 
acquiring firm. This result may not be preferred by managers in case 
their compensation is tied to the level of accounting earnings. A 
pooling of interests merger is one way this disadvantage can be 
avoided. But the conditions required for a pooling of interests 
transaction are often difficult to meet. An asset-for-stock exchange 
is another means of attaining the objective of reducing goodwill, 
while still gaining control of the target [Herz and Abahoonie 
(1990)]. 
The popular business press suggests that another possible 
motivation in structuring the transaction as an asset-for-stock 
exchange is for a low P/E ratio firm to create a public market for a 
high P/E ratio business without losing effective control over the 
divested unit. This argument assumes that the market was 
undervaluing the high P/E business. Some evidence suggests that 
‘pure plays’ are valued more by investors. However, this reason does 
not agree with the notion of efficient markets and could not be the 
motive behind this reorganization. 
Studies on mergers (Dennis and McConnell) find evidence of 
higher percentage returns to acquired firms than to acquiring firms, 
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but find that dollar gains are more equally distributed. In an 
examination of joint ventures, McConnell and Nantell (1985), 
comparing the valuation effects with those in mergers, find support 
for the synergy hypothesis over the management displacement 
13 
hypothesis. They find that returns to joint venture partners are 
between those to acquiring and acquired firms in mergers, with the 
smaller partner having a higher percentage return. The dollar gains 
to the joint venture partners are more equally divided. 
In an asset-for-stock exchange, one firm divests assets and 
acquires stock in the other firm, while the other firm gets assets 
and gives a part of its equity to the first firm. Looking at this 
transaction from the viewpoint of the merger literature, we can say 
that the first firm is the acquirer, while the other firm is the 
target. But if we look at this transaction from the divestiture 
point of view, the first firm is the target and the second one is 
the bidder, as it acquires assets. Based on the arguments made 
earlier and this intuition, we hypothesize: 
1. Both firms will gain from this transaction due to improved 
allocation of assets as a result of transferring assets to a 
more capable management or achieving gains from a transfer 
of control. 
2. Portfolios of matched pairs of divestors and acquirers will 
gain at the time of announcement of an asset-for-stock 
exchange. The gains will be shared more equally than has 
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been noted in either the merger or the divestiture 
literature. 
3.2.2.2 Relatedness of Acquired Unit 
Schipper and Smith (1983) and Hite, Owers and Rogers (1987) 
argue that ‘diminishing returns to management’ may arise as the 
number and diversity of transactions organized within a firm 
increases. Schipper and Smith show that firms usually spin-off 
dissimilar businesses. 
3. We suggest that similar benefits can arise from an asset- 
for-stock exchange. Further, the divested unit will be 
dissimilar to the divestor’s other businesses and will be 
similar to the acquiring firm’s business. We also expect to 
find a larger gain to acquiring firms in related 
acquisitions. 
3.2.2.3 Implications of Transfer of Control Due to the Acquisition 
of Stock 
Mikkelson and Ruback (1985) measure the effect on stock prices 
of corporate investments of 5% or more in another company’s equity. 
Their primary focus was on 13D filings that are not associated with 
a takeover proposal. At the initial announcement both the acquiring 
and acquired firms gain. If the takeover is completed, the total 
valuation effect for the acquiring firm is zero and is large and 
positive for the acquired firm. However, acquiring firms gain if the 
takeover is completed by a third party, shares are sold to a third 
party, or a targeted repurchase occurs. An interesting finding is 
that the initially reported investment in the target firm’s shares 
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varies across the different types of initial announcements and 
outcomes. Outstanding takeover proposals are associated with the 
largest average ownership position of 37%, the subsample considering 
a takeover has an average position of 21% and the investment 
subsample shows a holding of 9.8%. Classified by the outcome, the 
takeover sample has a holding exceeding 30% whereas the sample in 
which there is no outcome within three years has an initial equity 
stake of 13.7%. Target firms with no outcome had substantial 
negative returns during the three years after the announcement. 
Though their sample did not allow them to compute a similar figure 
for the acquiring firm, they hypothesize that the acquirer’s returns 
will be negative due to its holding in the target. These findings 
will be compared with our results. 
Choi (1991) extends Mikkelson and Ruback’s work to consider the 
proposition that toehold acquisitions facilitate value enhancing 
control transfers, which in addition to takeovers include internal 
mechanisms like proxy fights and management turnover. He finds 
evidence of transfer of control following toehold acquisitions and 
observes that targets with control transfer earned a significant 
positive return while those not having a transfer of control had a 
negative return. The possibility that poor performance or managerial 
inefficiency encourage the transfer of control is supported by the 
negative abnormal returns in the pre-acquisition period. 
From the acquirer’s perspective, a stock payment in an asset- 
for-stock exchange can be viewed as a private placement of equity. 
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Wruck (1989) found that firms having private equity sales had a gain 
of 4.5% at announcement, as compared to a negative abnormal return 
of 3% in public equity offerings. The positive effect in private 
offerings is explained by the positive signal sent by a well- 
informed investor buying a block of securities. In her sample, a 
private equity sale also led to an increase in ownership 
concentration. Carrying out an analysis similar to that of Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1988), she observed that the relationship 
between changes in firm value at announcement and ownership 
concentration is positive when the ownership concentration is low 
(0% to 5%) or high (> 25%). Between 5% and 25%, the relationship is 
negative. She concludes that in this range the benefits of having a 
blockholder in place are outweighed by the ability of incumbent 
shareholders to become entrenched. 
Holderness and Sheehan (1988) find evidence showing that 
majority holders (exceeding 50% holding) do not expropriate wealth 
from the target, and are usually directly involved in the firm’s 
management. At the announcement of a trade in a majority block the 
shareholders gain 7.3% during a two day interval, but if the buyer 
is a corporation the gain is only 3.9%. They also suggest that a 
motive for a corporation to form a partially owned subsidiary may be 
the establishment of publicly traded claims as a foundation for 
performance based compensation. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) 
investigate the relationship between managerial ownership and market 
valuation of a firm. Their measure of market valuation, Tobin’s Q, 
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rises as board ownership increases from 0% to 5%, falls as the 
ownership rises further to 25% and continues to rise at a much 
slower rate as ownership increases beyond 25%. This would also 
suggest that effective managerial control occurs with even less than 
25% stockholding. 
Based on the findings in these studies, we expect to observe a 
relationship between the percentage of stock acquired and the 
abnormal return. While both firms involved in the transaction are 
expected to gain, the percentage of stock is hypothesized to 
influence how the gain is shared. More specifically: 
4. Acquirers will have higher gains when the percentage of 
stock is low or high. At high levels, the transaction is 
analogous to a merger and the gains should become similar to 
those observed for targets in mergers. Based on Wruck’s 
findings we do not expect a positive relationship at 
intermediate levels of holding. 
5. As the percentage of equity increases, the gains to 
divestors should decrease relative to the gains to 
acquirers. At high levels of equity acquired, the divestor 
is similar to an acquirer in takeovers. An implication is 
that most of the gains should be captured by acquirers. 
3.2.2.4 Role of Medium of Exchange 
We now concentrate on the differences between cash and stock as 
the medium of exchange. A stock payment may be advantageous to the 
14 
divestor due to it being tax-free and the possibility that it could 
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appreciate in value if the new unit adds to the acquirer’s value. 
For the acquirer, a stock payment may solve the problem of the 
acquired unit turning out to be a ‘lemon’ by making the value of the 
payment contingent on the performance of the acquired unit. A stock 
payment also has the advantage of lesser cash outflows for the 
acquirer. In most cases the acquisition will be tax-free to the 
acquirer and will be accounted for on a purchase basis. Comparing 
acquirers employing pooling with those using the purchase accounting 
method in mergers, Hong, Kaplan and Mandelker (1978) found that 
pooling does not raise the stock price of the acquirer and purchase 
does not lead to a lowering of the acquirer’s stock price. We do not 
feel that tax savings or benefits from the accounting method applied 
would be the primary motivation in an asset-for-stock exchange. 
Given that different methods of financing have different 
signaling implications [Myers and Majluf (1984)], Travlos (1987) 
examines if the different stock returns to bidders in mergers and 
tender offers are due to the difference in the method of financing 
the acquisition. For both, mergers and tender offers, he provides 
evidence that bidders suffer significant losses in pure stock 
exchange acquisitions and stock and cash combinations where stock 
forms the majority of the consideration, but experience normal 
returns in cash offers. In Myers and Majluf’s model, bidder managers 
will prefer cash offers if they believe that their firm is 
undervalued and stock offers if they believe that their firm is 
overvalued. So a cash offer is interpreted by the market as good 
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news and a common stock exchange offer as bad news about the 
bidder’s true value. The acquiring firm’s price reaction at the 
announcement of an asset-for-stock exchange will reflect both, the 
gains from acquiring the asset and a negative information effect due 
to stock being the consideration. A reading of the news reports 
about our sample suggests that a major motive is to achieve the 
synergistic gains available from concentrating in separate 
businesses. In this case, a stock payment allows the divestor to 
continue participating in the divested business. 
From the acquirer’s perspective, an advantage of paying in stock 
over cash is that the value of the payment is contingent on the 
value it adds to the acquirer’s stock. Fishman (1989) and Hansen 
(1987) propose models for the form of consideration in acquisitions. 
In Fishman’s model, a cash payment makes an offer contingent on the 
target’s information about future cash flows, while a securities 
offer’s value is contingent on the cash flows themselves. A 
securities offer is made by lower valuing bidders and its advantage 
lies in making an efficient accept/reject decision. While the 
different implications of the medium of payment have been examined 
in the case of takeovers, no such analysis has been carried out for 
divestitures. A comparison of our results with those of cash sales 
of assets is expected to provide more insights into the role of the 
medium of payment in restructuring transactions. 
6. The above arguments predict a lower return to acquirers in 
asset-for-stock exchanges than in cash acquisitions. In case 
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cash forms a part of the consideration along with stock, the 
returns to acquirers will be higher than in a pure stock 
transaction. 
A common stock payment by the firm acquiring the assets also 
leads to a decrease in managerial holding in the firm. Leland and 
Pyle’s (1977) signaling model and Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) 
agency theory suggest that the larger the decrease in managerial 
holding the larger will be the negative stock price reaction. In 
this case we expect to find that the announcement period abnormal 
returns (if negative) will vary inversely with the proportion of 
transaction financed through common stock. Dilution of stockholding 
and Earnings Per Share due to the issuance of additional stock is 
also expected to lead to negative returns to acquirers. 
A number of asset-for-stock exchange transactions are 
accompanied by an agreement limiting voting rights, further 
purchases of stock or disposal of the acquired stock. The net effect 
is similar to that of a standstill agreement. Dann and DeAngelo 
(1983) examine the effects of standstill agreements. Firms that 
repurchase shares and obtain a standstill agreement lose at the 
announcement of the agreement. An agreement without a repurchase 
also leads to a decrease in wealth. Bradley and Wakeman (1983) 
observe that the informational impact of a standstill agreement is 
similar to that of a merger termination. 
7. Restrictions should result in negative returns to acquirers 
in our sample. Since there are other reasons that 
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hypothesize positive returns to acquirers, the net effect of 
restrictions on voting rights, further purchases or disposal 
of stock may be to reduce the positive impact for acquirers. 
If the gains to divestors result from gaining some degree of 
control through owning stock, such restrictions should lead 
to reduction in their abnormal returns. 
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Endnotes 
1. This is not categorically stated in the sell-off studies, but in 
the absence of any explicit information we can infer that this 
was the case. 
2. This should have become more popular in the recent past due to 
the high incidence of leveraged buyout activity. 
3. Dennis and McConnell (1986), Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983). 
4. Jarrell, Brickley and Netter review evidence that suggests 
insignificant negative returns to bidders in the 1980’s. 
5. Both firms could be undervalued by the market and the gain may 
reflect information about this underpricing. Brennan (1990) 
suggests that asset sales are partially motivated by the desire 
to signal value. Presumably the signal of value is provided by 
the selling price. If this is the case, there will be a higher 
chance of signaling taking place in cash sales than in asset 
trades. Hite, Owers and Rogers’ find support for the synergy 
hypothesis over the information hypothesis. Based on this 
evidence, we feel that information effects will not drive our 
results. 
6. Gains are also expected to be larger due to the tax-free nature 
of asset-for-asset exchanges. 
7. Pre-event negative performance could also lead to larger gains. 
8. In the context of mergers, Roll (1988) questions why the gains 
are not equally divided between the acquiring and acquired 
firms, which is expected if synergy is the primary motive in the 
merger transaction. 
9. It is possible that asset-for-stock exchanges allow the divestor 
to gain superior management skills of the acquirer. In that case 
we should not find many occurrences of acquiring firm managers 
being replaced. 
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10. Another advantage of asset-for-stock exchanges over joint 
ventures concerns the time element of investments. Joint 
ventures are usually set to work on a time frame and with a 
specific project in mind. Asset-for-stock exchanges are more 
flexible in time and also when changes in the environment 
require changes in the company. Stock is also more marketable 
than a joint venture. 
11. Harrigan (1986) discusses these issues in greater detail. 
12. Transactions where parents merge their subsidiaries in the same 
industry do take place. A recent proposal that was eventually 
aborted, involved the merger of BellSouth Corp.’s and Lin 
Broadcasting’s cellular phone properties. 
13. The management displacement hypothesis suggests that mergers 
facilitate replacement of the acquired company’s inefficient 
management. The merger studies have found it difficult to 
distinguish empirically between these hypotheses. Since joint 
ventures do not lead to changes in the management of the parent 
firms, if the synergy hypothesis is correct, McConnell and 
Nantell suggest that the joint venture partners should have 
returns similar to those of companies involved in mergers. 
14. Not all transactions will be tax-free to the divestor. Depending 
on the exact terms of the transaction, and the relationship 
between the firms, different sections of the tax code will be 
applicable. It is difficult for us to determine the status of 
each transaction. Some asset-for-stock exchanges will be tax- 
free due to the section relating to asset-for-asset exchanges 
being applicable to them. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Sample Selection 
Our sample includes asset exchanges completed during the period 
from 1968 to 1990. The sample for the period 1979-1990 was obtained 
by a detailed examination of divestitures listed in Mergers and 
Acquisitions which reports completed transactions with a value 
exceeding Si million. The sample for the period prior to 1979 was 
drawn from the Statistical Report on Mergers and Acquisitions that 
was published by the Federal Trade Commission through 1978. An 
additional requirement was that the firms should be listed on the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) daily returns file at 
the time of the exchange announcement and a complete return series 
was available for the interval starting 200 days prior to the 
announcement date and ending 50 days after the announcement date. 
The announcement and completion dates were identified by an 
examination of the Wall Street Journal Index and the complete 
article in the Wall Street Journal. If required, these dates were 
confirmed from the Predicasts F&S Index and the proxy statements.1 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
4.2.1 Asset-for-Asset Exchanges 
Descriptive statistics for the sample are given in Table 4.1. 
Thirty-five transactions involving an asset-for-asset exchange were 
identified. Of the fifty-nine traded firms involved in these 
transactions, eight were dropped due to an incomplete return series 
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and another eight were dropped from the sample due to the existence 
2 
of confounding events during the announcement period. The final 
sample consists of forty-three firms out of which four were traded 
in the Over The Counter (OTC) market. The market value of equity was 
measured at the end of the sixth trading day prior to the 
announcement date. The four OTC firms had a market value of equity 
ranging from $62.4 million to $3,249 million, with a mean of $1,097 
million. The complete sample had a mean market value of equity of 
$4,158 million with a median of $1,229 million. The variation in the 
market value of equity of the firms in our sample makes an 
examination of dollar returns particularly relevant. 
Twelve firms in our sample also received cash in addition to 
other operating assets. The cash received ranged from $15.0 million 
to $800 million. In most cases the firms did not announce the value 
of the transaction. The twelve announced transaction values ranged 
from $15 million to $1,000 million, with a mean of $134 million. The 
largest transaction value and cash amount were for the same firm. 
Four firms were common to these two subsamples (cash/non-cash and 
transaction value disclosed/not disclosed). These two subsamples 
also had larger mean and median equity values than that of the 
3 
complete sample. Six transactions were undertaken by firms covered 
by the media ownership guidelines of the FCC, though none of these 
transactions was forced by the need to comply with these guidelines. 
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4.2.2 Asset-for-Stock Exchanges 
Our sample of asset-for-stock exchanges consists of ninety-five 
divestors and one-hundred-seven acquirers (Table 4.2, Panel A). Of 
these, twenty-two divestors and thirty-one acquirers were traded in 
the OTC market. There was wide variation in the total market value 
of equity for these firms. The acquirers with a mean equity value of 
S992 million and a median of $235 million were in general smaller 
than the divestors who had a mean equity value of $2,332 million and 
a median value of $634 million (Table 4.3, Panel B). This is 
different from takeovers where acquirers are generally larger than 
targets. In the only sell-off study that reports similar statistics 
(Hite, Owers and Rogers), the median bidder and seller were similar 
4 
in size. 
For the complete sample, the transaction value ranged from $3 
million to $7,008 million (Table 4.3, Panel A). The mean and median 
transaction values for the subsample of divestors were $250 million 
and $42 million. The corresponding values for the acquirers were 
$287 million and $42 million, respectively. The transaction value 
ranged from 0.1% to 654.7%5 of the market value of equity with a 
median of 21.9% (Table 4.3, Panel C). The transaction values for the 
OTC firms ranged from 1.8% to 342.4% of equity with a median of 
35.1%. The median for the exchange listed firms was 19.8%. The 
median transaction value as a percentage of equity for divestors was 
14.3% and for acquirers was 26.0%. The transaction price as a 
percentage of firm value (market value of equity plus book value of 
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debt) in Hite, Owers and Rogers’ sample of sell-offs was 8.2% for 
divestors and 9.7% for acquirers. 
Table 4.2 Panel B provides details of the percentage of stock 
involved in these exchanges. Divestors acquired an average of 24.7% 
of the acquirer’s stock, with the median being 20.0%. The average 
stock acquired in the the subsample of acquirers was 21.1%, with the 
median being 14.9%. Wruck’s sample of private equity sales involved 
an average of 19.6% (median= 12.3%) of voting rights, though the 
transactions in her sample were smaller in magnitude than ours. 
In nineteen instances the consideration was a convertible 
security. Of these, fourteen firms were listed on the exchanges. In 
seventeen cases some restrictions were placed on voting rights of 
stock, the resale of stock or a standstill agreement was reached as 
a part of the transaction. In thirteen cases the division sold was 
incurring losses. 
Some newspaper articles accompanying the announcement of an 
asset-for-stock exchange also gave the reasons for the transaction 
as provided by the firm’s management. Table 4.4 gives a list of 
reasons and their frequency of occurrence. Some of the firms 
provided multiple reasons. The major reason provided for the 
transaction by the seller was to get out of the divested business 
and concentrate on the other businesses. A further examination of 
the Wall Street Journal articles indicates that in a majority of 
cases the divestor completely got out of the divested business. In 
some instances the consideration consisted of some cash in addition 
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to stock. Twelve firms provided the need to obtain cash as a reason. 
In most of these cases the cash was supposed to be used to reduce 
debt. A less frequently stated reason was to get out of a slow 
growth or a non-profitable business. 
The major justification given for stock as the consideration was 
to keep it as an investment. The other reasons were to participate 
in the future potential of the divested business, to combine the 
divested business with a publicly traded firm in a similar business 
and to have an active role in the management of the acquirer. 
A majority of acquirers purchased assets that supplement a 
product line in the existing business. As a result the transaction 
led to a specialization in different businesses by the divestor and 
the acquirer. The other common reasons were to enter a new business 
in a similar market or the same business in a new geographical 
market. Thus, in a majority of cases the unit acquired was related 
to the existing business of the acquirer. 
Only in a few cases did the divestor increase its stockholding 
in the acquirer in the one year after the transaction was completed. 
While the new linkage was present for a period of time for most 
firms, in a few instances the divestor made a tax-free distribution 
of the acquirer’s stock to the its stockholders. 
4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 Event Study 
The event study methodology used here is similar to the one 
employed by Dodd and Warner (1983) and Hite, Owers and Rogers 
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(1987). For each security j, we used the market model 
R = a.+ 8 • R + € (1) 
jt J j mt jt 
where 
Rjt = rate of return on security j over period t. 
R = rate of return on the market index on day t. We use the 
mt J 
CRSP value-weighted index as the proxy for the market 
index. 
a = E(R ) - /3 «E(R ) 
j j J "» 
e.t = disturbance term of security j at period t, and 
E(e ) = 0 
jt 
/3j 
Cov (R , R ) 
j t mt 
Var(R ) 
mt 
e is a measure of the abnormal return to stockholders of firm j 
jt 
for period t. It represents the deviation of the return on the 
security from its expected return, given the return earned by the 
market index during that period. /3 »R is the part of the return 
j mt 
presumed to be caused by the market wide variables while the 
disturbance term captures the effect of firm-specific variables. 
When a group of firms experience the same event, the average 
disturbance of the group is interpreted as capturing the economic 
impact of that event. Using the market model we calculate the 
prediction error (abnormal return) PE for event day t as follows 
A A 
PE. = R. - (a .+ jS.-R . ) (2) 
Jt jt J J mt 
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where 
a. and £. are the ordinary least square estimates of the market 
J J 
model parameters for firm j, obtained by estimating (1). 
We estimate the market model parameters from days -200 to -51 in 
relation to the initial announcement day (t=0), which is the day the 
news of the transaction first appears in the Wall Street Journal. 
To measure the abnormal returns over an interval from T to 
i j 
. for firm j, the cumulative prediction error is defined as 
2j 
CPE = V PE 
j t=T jt 
1 j 
(3) 
For a sample of N securities the mean cumulative prediction error 
(cumulative abnormal return) is 
N 
CPE= Y. CPE. / N (4) 
j=i 
The test statistic described by Dodd and Warner (1983) calls for 
standardizing each abnormal return by the estimate of its standard 
error s.^. The standardized prediction error and the standardized 
cumulative prediction error over T^ to T^ are given by 
SPE = PE.. / s .. 
Jt Jt ' jt 
(5) 
2 j 
and SCPE = \ SPE / - T +1) 
j t4r Jt ' 2j lj 
i j 
(6) 
For the full sample the test statistic is given by 
N 
z = Y scpe. / ViT 
j=i J ' 
(7) 
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Under a null hypothesis of no abnormal returns, the abnormal 
returns are assumed to be normally distributed with a mean of zero 
8 
[Brown and Warner (1985)]. So the standardized abnormal returns are 
assumed to follow a t-distribution. The procedure also assumes 
serial and cross-sectional independence of standardized abnormal 
returns. With SPE . *s being independent unit normal under our null 
J ^ 
hypothesis, both SCPE . and Z will also be approximately unit 
J 
normal.9 
Contemporaneous events during the announcement period could 
affect stock prices. To remove such confounding effects we carry out 
our analysis with the exclusion of such observations.10 
We investigate the gains to each pair of firms in a transaction 
12 
and the dollar gains to both firms. This has not been done in any 
of the sell-off studies. 
The dollar returns are calculated in a manner similar to that 
li 
employed by Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988). The wealth gains to the 
13 
divestor and acquirer over an interval are given by: 
and 
where 
A W = W • CARD. 
D d j 
J J 
A W = W • CARA, 
A A 
J J J 
(8) 
(9) 
W = market value of divestor’s equity at the end of the day 
J 
prior to the first day of the interval, 
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CARD. = cumulative abnormal return to the divestor during the 
J 
interval, 
W = market value of acquirer’s equity at the end of the day 
A 
j 
prior to the first day of the interval, minus the value of 
acquirer’s shares already held by the divestor, 
CARA. = cumulative abnormal return to the acquiring firm during 
J 
the interval. 
We carry out the above calculations for various intervals around 
the announcement day. The change in the combined dollar value for 
each pair of firms is the sum of CARA and CARD. In studies on 
mergers by Dennis and McConnell (1986) and on tender offers by 
Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988), a skewed dollar return distribution 
was observed. In case we observe a skewed distribution the non- 
parametric Wilcoxon Signed-ranks Test is employed. This test 
utilizes information about the sign as well as the magnitude of 
14 
dollar returns. 
4.3.2 Matched Pairs 
To obtain the gains from each transaction, we first form 
portfolios for each pair of firms involved in a transaction by 
weighting their individual returns by the market value of each 
firm’s equity measured at the close of trading on the sixth day 
prior to the announcement. The weights for each divestor in a pair 









and for the acquirer in the pair by 
AE. 




DW. = weight for the divestor in portfolio i, 
AW. = weight for the acquirer in portfolio i, 
DE. = market value of divestor’s equity at the end of the sixth 
trading day prior to the date of announcement of an asset 
exchange, 
AE^ = market value of acquirer’s equity at the end of the sixth 
trading day prior to the date of announcement of an asset 
exchange. 
The return for each matched pair is then defined as: 
RP = AW • RA + DW • RD 
it i it i it 
where 
(12) 
RP.t = return to a value-weighted portfolio of the divestor and 
acquirer in transaction i at time t, 
RA.t = return to the acquirer in portfolio i at time t, 
RD = return to the divestor in portfolio i at time t. 
it 
The portfolio returns are then used instead of individual 
security returns in equations (1) and (2) to obtain the returns to 
portfolios of matched pairs of firms. We value weight within each 
portfolio, but each portfolio is equally weighted in obtaining 
abnormal returns to matched pairs. 
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4.3.3 Returns for OTC Firms 
A number of transactions are between an OTC firm and an exchange 
listed firm. For the preliminary analysis, we delete any OTC firm 
having missing or zero returns with no stock traded on four 
consecutive days. Since this condition did not lead to the deletion 
of any firm from our sample, we did not follow it for the remaining 
analysis. In the final analysis we used a methodology similar to 
Handjinicolaou and Kalay’s (1984), and calculated multi-day returns 
for missing intervals and created a new series of returns for the 
firm and the market index. Other screens such as the number of 
market makers and whether the firm belonged to the National Market 
System were also employed to ensure that the inclusion of OTC firms 
does not bias the results. Since most of the OTC firms in our sample 
were members of the National Market System and had multiple market 
makers, these screens did not result in a material change in the 
results. 
If a firm’s stock does not trade on a number of days, the beta 
obtained from estimating the market model will be biased downwards. 
In addition to the methodology given in the previous paragraph, we 
also carried out all the tests using market adjusted returns. The 
abnormal return in this case is given by 
PE = R - R (13) 
jt jt mt 
where R and R are as defined in equation (1). The advantage in 
jt mt 
using this specification is that the coefficient of R is always 
equal to one and is not dependent on each firm’s beta. 
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4.3.4 Effect of Size of the Divested Unit 
The divestiture literature documents a relationship between the 
size of the divestiture and the excess returns. The returns are also 
examined in relation to the size of the transaction and firms 
involved. The calculation of dollar returns also achieves this 
purpose. 
4.3.5 Variance Changes 
There is a possibility that asset exchanges may be carried out 
to increase the variance of the assets. We carry out our tests using 
both pre- and post-event intervals to estimate the market model 
parameters. Post-event beta coefficients are calculated using 
returns for days +51 to +200. The screening criterion is changed to 
include firms that have a complete return series for the period from 
days -50 to +200. 
Vetsuypens (1985) examined the possibility that firms may use 
the funds from asset sales to acquire alternative assets with higher 
variance rates. This asset substitution can lead to a wealth 
transfer from bondholders to stockholders. His empirical evidence 
failed to support this hypothesis. 
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Endnotes 
1. Firms having a material divestiture of assets are required to 
file form 8K with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
within 15 days of the event. This filing could also be used to 
identify the event date. 
2. There was no observable regularity in the type of confounding 
event. 
3. These statistics are presented later in Panel B of Table 5.11. 
4. Hite, Owers and Rogers’ measure of size was the transaction 
price as a percentage of firm’s value (Market Value of Equity + 
Book Value of Debt). 
5. Such large percentages can occur for distressed firms and OTC 
firms. Hite, Owers and Rogers also note the existence of some 
large transactions. Since payment in asset-for-stock exchanges 
does not involve cash, a small firm can acquire a much larger 
unit by issuing stock. 
6. Value of s 2 
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s. = residual variance for security j from the market model 
J 
estimation, 
D. = number of observations during the estimation period, 
J 
R = rate of return on the market index m for day x of the 
mx 
estimation period, 
R = mean rate of return on the market index m during the 
m 
estimation period, 
R , = rate of return on the market index m for day t. 
mt 
Appropriate modifications were made in this formula when the 
Market Adjusted Returns methodology was used. 
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7. The Z given here should not be confused with the standard normal 
z-statistic. This terminology is adopted to conform to that used 
in other studies. 
8. Also see Fama (1976) for a discussion on the properties of stock 
returns. Further evidence on the abilities of the various event 
study methodologies is provided by Dyckman, Philbrick and 
Stephan (1984). 
9. See pages 412-414 in Dodd and Warner (1983). They discuss the 
properties of the standardized cumulative returns and the test 
statistic in footnote 24 on page 413. 
10. We also carried out our tests with the inclusion of these 
observations. This did not yield significantly different 
results. 
11. Roll (1986) proposes the ‘Hubris hypothesis’ which posits that 
gains to targets in mergers represent wealth transfers from the 
acquiring firm’s stockholders. Roll (1988) has also argued that 
if synergy is leading to gains in mergers, then the gains should 
be evenly split between the acquiring and acquired firms. The 
mode of analysis proposed here will allow us to test these 
effects. 
12. In the context of mergers, Malatesta (1983) and Roll (1986) 
argue that the appropriate metric for determining the impact of 
mergers on securityholder’s wealth is the change in dollar 
values of securities due to the merger. 
13. In case of asset-for-asset exchanges, there is no distinction 
between the divestor and the acquirer, and the calculation of 
dollar returns is similar to that for the divestor. 
14. For more details on this test, see Siegel, 1956, Non Parametric 
Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences, 75-83. 
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Table 4.1 
Distribution of sample by announcement year and market value of 
equity for firms undertaking an asset-for-asset exchange. 
Panel A: Transactions by year of announcement. 
Year Number of 
Transactions 
Number of firms 
meeting criteri 
1977 1 1 
1978 0 0 
1979 1 0 
1980 0 0 
1981 4 3 
1982 3 5 
1983 3 3 
1984 4 7 
1985 3 5 
1986 5 6 
1987 2 3 
1988 3 2 





Panel B: Frequency distribution for market value of equity of firms 
in the sample. 
Range Number of 
$ millions firms 






















Distribution of sample by announcement year and by percentage of 
equity acquired for divestors and acquirers in asset-for-stock 
exchanges. 






1968 1 0 1 0 
1969 3 0 3 0 
1970 1 0 1 2 
1972 2 0 1 0 
1975 3 2 4 1 
1979 0 3 1 0 
1980 2 2 4 2 
1981 5 2 9 2 
1982 7 1 5 4 
1983 11 3 9 4 
1984 6 3 6 5 
1985 8 1 4 4 
1986 3 2 5 1 
1987 5 1 5 2 
1988 4 2 4 1 
1989 7 2 8 3 
Total 73 22 76 31 
: Distribution of percentage of stock acquired in asset-for- 
stock exchanges. Upper bound 
the next category. 
of each range is included in 
Range Divestors Acquirers 
Unknown 15 11 
< 5 10 22 
5 to 10 11 15 
10 to 15 11 11 
15 to 20 6 9 
20 to 30 20 16 
30 to 50 11 12 
50 to 80 9 9 
> 80 2 2 
Total 95 107 
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Table 4.3 
Statistics of the dollar value of transactions and market value of 
equity for firms undertaking asset-for-stock exchanges. 
Panel A: Summary statistics of dollar value of transactions in 
asset-for-stock exchanges (in $ millions). 
Panel B: 
Divestors Acquirers 
Maximum 7008 7008 
Mean 250 287 
Median 42 42 
Minimum 3 3 
Market Value of Equity (in $ millions). 
Year Divestors Acquirers 
Exchange 0TC Exchange OTC 
Maximum 73445 1950 22357 1852 
Mean 2955 265 1331 173 
Median 782 104 341 43 
Minimum 18 4 3 4 
Combined OTC and Exchange listed firms 
Mean 2332 992 
Median 634 235 
Panel C: Distribution of transaction price as a percentage of 
equity value. 
Divestors Acquirers Exchange OTC 
260.1% 654.7% Maximum 654.7% 342.4% 
35.4 69. 8 Mean 45. 8 75. 8 
14.3 26. 0 Median 19.8 35. 1 
0. 1 0. 6 Minimum 0. 1 1.8 
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Table 4.4 
Reasons provided by divestors and acquirers for engaging in asset- 
for-stock exchanges. Some divestors provided multiple reasons, while 
others did not provide any reason. 
Reasons provided by divestors 
Get out of this business and concentrate on other businesses 25 
Obtain cash 12 
Divest a non-profitable or slow growth business 11 
Reduce debt using the cash obtained in addition to stock 8 
Unit is losing money 6 
Unit can be operated more efficiently by the acquirer 5 
Takeover related 2 
Others 3 
Total 72 
Reasons provided by acquirers 
Supplement the product line in an existing business 44 
New business in a similar market 11 
Same business in a new geographical market 8 
Defensive measure to avoid a takeover 2 
Others 3 
Total 68 
Reasons provided by divestors for stock as the consideration 
Investment purposes 10 
Participate in future potential growth 9 
Want an active role in managing the acquirer 5 




RESULTS FOR ASSET-FOR-ASSET EXCHANGES 
In addition to the stock price reaction around the announcement 
for the ccitplete sample, we also observed the reaction for 
s-bsamples of firms that did/did not provide information about the 
transaction’s value at the time of the announcement and firms that 
did/did not receive cash along with operating assets in the 
exchange. This was done to explain the pattern of returns observed 
around the announcement of the transaction. Dollar abnormal returns 
for the complete sample and the subsamples were also calculated. 
Finally, we calculated the gains to portfolios of matched pairs of 
firms in each transaction. 
5.1 Announcement Effects 
Table 5.1 summarizes the stock price reaction around the 
announcement date for the forty-three firms undertaking asset-for- 
asset exchanges. The firms in our sample had a positive abnormal 
return of 0.54% (t=1.46, p=15.1%) on day -1 and a negative abnormal 
return of -0.58% (t=-1.60, p=11.7%) on day 0. The two-day return for 
the period days -1 to 0 was also negative insignificant.1 On day -1, 
56% of the prediction errors were positive, while the corresponding 
figures for day 0 and the interval from days -1 to 0 were 40% and 
46% respectively. Table 5.2 provides more details of the returns on 
these two days. The returns on day 0 were generally lower than those 
on day -1 and also had a larger range. During the interval from days 
+1 to +5 only 30% of the firms had positive prediction errors and 
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the overall sample had significant negative abnormal returns of 
-1.53% (z=-2.36, p=1.8%). Since a majority of firms in our sample 
did not disclose the value of the transaction, the reversal in the 
sign of abnormal returns between days -1 and 0 might suggest that in 
the absence of such information the market is unable to assess the 
2 
wealth impact of asset exchanges. 
5.1.1 Impact of Cash Being a Part of the Consideration 
Since one of our major objectives is to study the impact of 
liquidity, we subdivided our sample into firms that received some 
cash along with other operating assets and those that did not 
receive any cash. Table 5.3 presents the results of this analysis. 
Firms that received cash, had significant negative returns of -1.58% 
on day 0 (t=-3.03, p=1.0%). In contrast, the non-cash sample did not 
show evidence of a strong negative reaction around the announcement 
date, although the negative abnormal return of -1.32% (z=1.84, 
p=6.6%) during the five day post-announcement period was 
significant. In contrast to the negative post-announcement period 
returns, this subsample had positive abnormal returns of 5.16% 
(z=1.73, p=8.4%) during the period days -50 to 0. This might suggest 
that the market views the need for liquidity negatively, though the 
post-event negative returns are intriguing. 
5.1.2 Impact of Announcement of Transaction Value 
If information effects are present, presumably the signal is 
provided by the value of the transaction. Unlike most other 
restructuring activity, only twelve out of forty-three firms 
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announced the value of the transaction. For the nine firms which 
provided details of the value of the transaction and for which data 
on Total Assets was available on the Compustat Tapes, the 
transaction’s value ranged from 0.12% to 28.19% of Total Assets 
(measured as the year-end figure for the year prior to the year of 
the transaction) with a mean of 7.64%. For the same nine firms the 
transaction value was between 0.15% to 62.54% of the market value of 
equity with a mean of 12.36%. The smallest of these nine 
transactions was valued at $15 million. 
We subdivided our sample based on whether the transaction value 
was included in the announcement. Table 5.4 gives the results of 
tests on these subsamples. While the returns in the pre-event 
intervals were not significant, firms that declared the 
transaction’s value had a negative average cumulative prediction 
error of -3.17% (z=-2.61, p=0.9%) during the interval days +1 to +5. 
The subsample that did not provide any information had insignificant 
returns over all intervals under study. We further examined the 
subsample of seven firms that received cash but provided no 
information about the transaction’s value. These firms had an 
abnormal return of 0.67% (t=1.10, p=30.8%) on day -1, -1.20% 
(t=-2.02, p=8.3%) on day 0 and an insignificant return of -1.01% 
over days +1 to +5. For a sample of seven firms that provided 
information about the transaction’s value but did not receive cash, 
we found abnormal returns of 0.82% (t=1.47, p=18.5%) on day -1 and 
0.05% (t=0.08, p=93.8%) on day 0. The abnormal return for days +1 to 
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+5 was -3.01% (z=-2.30, p=2.1%). The abnormal returns for twenty- 
four firms that did not provide any information about the 
transaction value and also did not receive any cash were 
insignificant over all intervals. Though some of the samples 
discussed above are small in size, the evidence suggests that firms 
that receive cash along with other assets lose at the announcement 
of the transaction, while most firms lose during the five day post- 
3 
announcement interval. During days +1 to +5 a larger percentage of 
firms that received cash or announced the transaction’s value had 
negative abnormal returns. 
We also carried out a t-test for the difference of mean returns 
for the cash/non-cash samples and the subsamples where the value of 
the transaction was/was not provided. Out of the returns for the 
intervals days -50 to 0, day 0 and days +1 to +5, only the returns 
during days +1 to +5 differed for the subsamples where the 
transaction value was known/not known at the time of announcement. 
The t-value of -2.12 was significant at the 4% level. 
The above results point to the possible existence of both 
information effects and negative effects of obtaining liquidity. Our 
results differ from Klein’s (1986), in that she observed positive 
returns to firms that disclosed the transaction price in sell-offs. 
In most asset-for-asset exchanges the acquired and divested assets 
were in the same business. This might suggest that a mere geographic 
realignment of the portfolio of assets does not lead to creation of 
synergistic benefits. If a firm obtains cash in addition to 
69 
cpcra:ing assets in an asset-for-asset exchange, there is a 
possibility of a decrease in the firm's future cash flows unless the 
cash is invested in income earning assets. The possibility that this 
cash will not be invested profitably might lead to negative returns 
for firms obtaining some cash along with other operating assets. 
Alternatively, receiving cash may signal the existence of poor 
performance leading to liquidity problems. 
5.1.3 Alternative Proxies for the Market Return and the Use of a 
Post-Event Estimation Interval 
The use of different market indexes and market adjusted returns 
did not generate materially different results. Tables 5.5 and 5.6 
give the results when the NASDAQ and S&P500 indexes were used as 
proxies for the market’s return. Table 5.7 gives the results when 
market adjusted returns were used and Table 5.8 gives the results 
when betas were estimated using a post-event interval. The number of 
firms in the sample when using a post-event estimation interval was 
fewer due to the the use of a different set of screens which 
resulted in elimination of firms that carried out exchanges in 
1990.4 
5.1.4 Shifts in Betas 
It is possible that managers carry out exchanges to increase the 
riskiness of assets. Using the beta of the firm as a measure of this 
risk, we found that nineteen out of forty-three firms had an 
increase in beta between the pre-event and post-event periods and 
twenty-four firms had a decrease in beta. The results for these 
subsamples are shown in Tables 5.9 and 5.10. Firms that had an 
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increase in beta between the pre- and post-event periods did not 
have significant returns on any of the 21 days around the event. 
However, the negative cumulative abnormal return during the post¬ 
event period from days +1 to +5 of -1.56% (z=-2.99, p=0.3%) was 
significant. During this interval only 21% of the cumulative 
abnormal returns were positive. This is in contrast to the positive 
cumulative abnormal return of 2.00% (z=1.75, p=8.0%, 63% positive) 
during the interval from days -10 to 0. The subsample of firms 
having a decrease in beta during the post-event period had negative 
abnormal returns of -2.60% (z=-2.53, p=l.1%, 25% positive) during 
the interval from days -10 to 0. In contrast to the subsample in 
which the beta increased after the announcement of the exchange, the 
abnormal returns in this subsample during the period from days +1 to 
+5 were negative but not significantly different from zero. 
Tests were also carried out on these subsamples using market 
adjusted returns so that the estimation is independent of the 
individual stock betas. For the sample of firms which had a decrease 
in beta between the pre- and post-event periods, the returns during 
the interval from days -1 to 0 were -0.16% (z=-0.16, p=87.2%) and 
during the period from days +1 to +5 the abnormal returns were 
-0.09% (z=-0.40, p=68.9%). For firms that had an increase in beta, 
the abnormal return during days -1 to 0 was zero. Similar to the 
results reported earlier, these firms had negative abnormal returns 
of -2.19% (z=-2.11, p=3.5%) during the post-event period from days 
+1 to +5. 
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These results suggest that one explanation for the drop in 
returns in the complete sample of asset exchanges could be increased 
riskiness in the subsample where the beta increased as a 
result of the transaction. Thus the market seems to be valuing the 
change in the risk and not the exchange per se. 5 
5.1.5 Other Considerations 
We also examined the results for firms in the Communications 
industry and for the sample with these firms excluded. The results 
for these two subsamples were not materially different from those 
reported for the complete sample. 
There was no systematic evidence of other restructuring activity 
around the time of an asset-for-asset exchange. In particular, these 
firms were not takeover targets though an asset exchange could be 
used as a defensive measure. Only two firms in our sample had 
takeover bids outstanding at the time an exchange was announced. One 
of these firms was also undertaking an active divestiture program to 
increase its cash flows and reduce debt. 
5.2 Dollar Returns 
We also measured the dollar abnormal returns to firms in our 
sample. These were calculated by multiplying the abnormal return 
during any specified interval by the price of stock on the day prior 
to the first day of the interval.6 The dollar returns for the 
various subsamples discussed earlier are given in Table 5.11. Since 
the distribution of dollar returns is skewed, we conducted the 
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test to check for significance. For the 
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complete sample the mean dollar abnormal returns on day -1, day 0 
and the interval from days -1 to 0 were $26.8 million, $31.0 million 
and $57.8 million, respectively. However, the corresponding median 
dollar abnormal returns were $0.72 million, -$2.5 million, and 
-$0.46 million. This suggests that mean dollar gains were driven by 
a few large firms. None of these dollar abnormal returns were 
significant at any of the conventionally used levels. During days +1 
to +5, the average loss to all firms was -$58.1 million and the 
median loss was -$9.6 million, which is significant at the one 
percent level. This median loss equals 0.78% of the median equity 
7 
value of all firms. 
Firms that received cash in addition to operating assets had 
dollar abnormal returns of $87.1 million (median= -$5.6 million) 
during the interval days -1 to 0. In this subsample, only the dollar 
abnormal returns of -$65.8 million (median= -$7.0 million) during 
days +1 to +5 were significant at the five percent level. The dollar 
losses of -$55.1 million (median= -$12.2 million) during days +1 to 
+5 for the non-cash subsample were also significant. 
For the subsample of firms that did not provide the value of the 
transaction at the time of the announcement, the dollar returns 
during days -1 to 0 of $43.6 million (median= -$0.59 million) were 
not significant at any of the conventionally used levels. However, 
the returns of -$50.9 million (median= -$6.9 million) during the 
interval days +1 to +5 were significant at the five percent level. 
For the subsample of firms that provided the transaction’s value at 
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the time of announcement of the exchange, only the dollar losses of 
-$91.5 million (median= -$14.8 million) during the period days +1 to 
+5 were significant at the five percent level. 
Since the value of the transaction was not provided in most 
cases, we also examined the magnitude of dollar returns as a 
percentage of Total Assets for the intervals days -1 to 0 and days 
+1 to +5. For the sample of thirty-seven firms for which information 
on Total Assets was available on the Compustat Tapes, the dollar 
abnormal return as a percentage of Total Assets during days -1 to 0 
ranged from -3.58% to 11.28% with a mean of 0.95% (median= 0.09%). 
The range for the interval from days +1 to +5 was -11.15% to 5.66% 
with a mean of -1.56% (median= -0.72%). For the subsample of nine 
firms that announced the transaction’s value and had complete 
information available on the Compustat Tapes, the mean dollar 
abnormal return as a percentage of Total Assets for days -1 to 0 was 
1.48% (median= 0.36%), and ranged from -3.58% to 11.28%. The 
corresponding mean for days +1 to +5 was -3.69% (median= -1.95%) 
with a range of -11.15% to 2.46%. 
The analysis of dollar returns generally confirms the analysis 
of percentage abnormal returns. When compared with the results of 
dollar returns in studies by Dennis and McConnell and Bradley, Desai 
and Kim, the mean dollar returns (at least for the period days +1 
to +5) are quite large, despite the fact that asset exchanges 
involve only a part of the firm’s assets. 
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5.3 Relationship between Transaction Size and Returns 
The divestiture literature suggests that the magnitude of 
abnormal returns is related to the size of the transaction. In 
addition to examining dollar returns, we carried out some more tests 
to study the impact of transaction size. Since the value of the 
transaction was not known in most cases, we divided the sample of 
forty-three firms into twenty-two large firms and twenty-one small 
firms based on the market value of their equity six days prior to 
the announcement of the transaction. 
The results in Tables 5.12 and 5.13 show that the large firms 
had positive returns during both, days -1 and 0 and abnormal returns 
of 1.09% (z=1.67, p=9.5%, 50% positive) during the interval -1 to 0. 
However, these firms had negative returns during the period from 
days +1 to +5 of -1.97% (z=-2.12, p=3.4%, 23% positive). In 
contrast, the small firms had negative abnormal returns on day 0 of 
-2.14% (t=-3.20, p=0.4%, 24% positive) which is significant at the 
one percent level. The small firms also had a negative abnormal 
return of -1.23% (z=-2.05, p=4.0%, 38% positive) during the period 
from days -1 to 0. The post-event returns for small firms were 
insignificant, though negative. In dollar terms, the large firms 
gained $115.4 million ($68.7 million if General Electric is 
excluded) on days -1 to 0, while the small firms lost $5.4 million 
during the interval from days -1 to 0. Eleven large firms and eight 
small firms had an increase in beta between the pre- and post-event 
periods. A chi-square test (test statistic= 1.28) suggests that 
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there is no relation between the size and direction of change in 
beta. 
For the twelve firms that announced the value of the transaction 
with the announcement of an exchange, we also regressed the 
percentage and dollar abnormal returns on the size of the 
transaction as a proportion of the firm’s total assets. The results 
of these regressions in Table 5.14 show that only the returns on day 
-1 were significantly related to the proportion of assets divested. 
However, when dollar returns were used, the /3 coefficient for day -1 
was not significantly different from zero. 
5.4 Results for Matched Pairs of Firms 
Table 5.15 gives the results for portfolios of matched pairs of 
firms in each transaction. Portfolios were created by weighting the 
returns for the firms in each pair by the market value of their 
equity at the close of trading on the sixth day prior to the day of 
the announcement. In our sample of thirteen matched pairs, on most 
days during the interval from days -5 to +5, the abnormal returns 
were negative. The mean cumulative abnormal return during the 
interval from days -1 to 0 was -1.06% (z=-1.96, p=5.0%) and over the 
interval from days +1 to +5 was -1.73% (z=-2.35, p=1.9%).9 Further 
analysis was carried out to examine the division of gains among the 
individual firms forming these portfolios. Table 5.16 reveals that 
only in a few instances did both firms gain during the various 
intervals. In fact, on day -1 both firms lost in four instances. On 
day 0 both firms lost in five pairs and during the interval days +1 
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to +5 both firms lost in eight pairs. These figures support the 
notion that asset-for-asset exchanges are not value enhancing 
transactions. In most instances they lead to losses to both firms or 
a redistribution of wealth between the firms. 
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Endnotes 
1. Dodd and Warner (1983) point out that with the standardization 
procedure, it is possible that the mean cumulative residual and 
the mean standardized cumulative residual will be of different 
signs. This might happen when most cumulative residuals are of 
one sign, but there are a few extreme outliers having unusually 
large standard deviations and have the opposite sign. In such a 
situation, the mean cumulative residual and the z-statistic, 
which is calculated for the mean standardized residual can also 
differ in sign. 
2. A further examination of firms that had a reversal in the 
direction of abnormal return did not suggest the existence of 
any variable that would differentiate such firms. 
3. Firms disposing or acquiring assets may in most cases be 
required to file form 8K with the SEC. Contents of these forms 
could give some clues for the post-event losses. 
4. We eliminated firms which did not have a complete return series 
from days -51 to +200. 
5. Out of the firms that had an increase in beta after the 
transaction, six firms provided the transaction’s value with the 
announcement of the exchange. 
6. If the price on this day was missing or equaled zero, the firm 
was dropped from the sample. As a result the sample sizes in 
Table 5.11 are smaller than in other tables. 
7. Gains to the subsamples that consist of firms disclosing the 
transaction value and those getting cash, would have been much 
lower and less than $10 million if one large firm with equity 
value more than $50,385 million is excluded. However, the losses 
during days +1 to +5 would be of a magnitude similar to that of 
the samples without this outlier being excluded. 
8. To obtain a better idea of the magnitude of these losses, we 
present the figures obtained by Bradley, Desai and Kim in their 
study of tender offers. They found mean gains of $107.08 million 
for targets, $17.30 million for acquirers and $117.11 million 
for combined firms during the period 1963-84. The mean equity 
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value of firms in their sample was smaller than for firms in our 
sample. The mean equity value for targets in their sample ranged 
from $379 million to $550 million during the three subperiods 
examined by them. The figure for bidders ranged from $1477 to 
$1624 million. 
9. A separate examination Showed that these 26 firms had abnormal 
returns of -0.82% (z=-1.58, p=11.4%) during the interval from 
days -1 to 0 and -1.41% (z=-2.33, p=1.98%) during the period 
from days +1 to +5. 
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Table 5.1 
Average prediction errors for various days and intervals around the 
announcement for the sample of forty-three firms undertaking asset- 
for-asset exchanges. 
Panel A: Daily average and cumulative prediction errors. 
DAY PE CPE t-statistic 
-10 -0.25% -0.25% -0. 67 
-9 -0.21 -0. 45 -0. 56 
-8 -0.08 -0.54 -0.23 
-7 0.02 -0. 52 0. 06 
-6 -0.27 -0. 79 -0. 74 
-5 0.21 -0. 58 0. 58 
-4 -0. 39 -0. 97 -1.06 
-3 0. 11 -0. 85 0. 31 
-2 0.21 -0. 64 0. 58 
-1 0. 54 -0. 10 1.46 
0 -0. 58 -0.69 -1.60 
1 -0.21 -0. 90 -0. 56 
2 0. 23 -0. 67 0. 61 
3 -0. 82 -1.49 -2.27** 
4 -0. 40 -1.89 -1. 10 
5 -0. 33 -2.22 -0. 91 
6 0.26 -1.96 0.70 
7 0.29 -1.67 0.78 
8 0. 12 -1.56 0. 32 
9 -0. 10 -1.65 -0.27 
10 -0. 22 -1.87 -0. 58 
Panel B: Mean cumulative prediction errors (in percent), proportion 
of positive returns and the z-statistic over various 







-50 to 0 3. 99 0. 56 1.35 
-10 to 0 -0. 69 0. 42 -0. 85 
-5 to 0 0. 10 0. 46 0. 28 
-2 to 0 0. 17 0. 51 0. 74 
-1 to 0 -0. 04 0. 46 0. 28 
+ 1 to +5 -1.53 0. 30 -2.36** 
-5 to +5 -1.43 0. 37 -1.55 
-10 to + 10 -0. 58 0. 37 -1.65*** 
** significant at the five percent level 
*** significant at the ten percent level 
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Table 5.2 
Frequency distribution of abnormal returns on days -1 and 0 for 
firms undertaking an asset-for-asset exchange. 
Panel A: Frequency distribution. 
Range Day -1 Day 0 
< -5 % 0 3 
-3 to -5 1 6 
-2 to -3 1 2 
-1 to -2 3 5 
-0. 5 to -1 9 5 





0 to 0. 5 5 2 
0. 5 to 1 6 6 
1 to 2 6 6 
2 to 3 3 1 
3 to 5 3 0 
> 5 1 2 
43 43 
Maximum 7.33% 11.79% 
Minimum -4.27% -7.29% 








+ve 11 5 
-ve 12 15 
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Table 5.3 
Comparison of abnormal returns to firms undertaking asset-for-asset 
exchanges involving receipt of some cash along with operating assets 
with those not involving receipt of any cash along with the other 
assets. 
Daily average and cumulative prediction errors. 
Cash Non-Cash 
n=12 n=31 
Day PE CPE t PE CPE t 
-10 -0.34% -0.34% -0. 62 -0.21% -0.21% -0. 48 
-9 0. 08 -0. 26 0. 15 -0. 32 -0. 53 -0.72 
-8 0. 43 0. 17 0. 79 -0. 28 -0. 81 -0.65 
-7 0. 53 0. 70 0. 97 -0. 18 -0. 99 -0. 40 
-6 -0. 43 0. 26 -0. 80 -0. 21 -1.20 -0. 48 
-5 0. 79 1.05 1.46 -0.01 -1.21 -0. 02 
-4 -0. 77 0. 28 -1.43 -0. 24 -1.45 -0. 55 
-3 -0. 40 -0. 12 -0. 74 0. 31 -1. 14 0. 71 
-2 0. 97 0. 84 1.80* ** -0.08 -1.22 -0. 18 
-1 0. 59 1.43 1.08 0. 52 -0. 70 1. 18 
0 -1.58 -0. 15 -3.03* -0. 20 -0. 90 -0. 45 
1 -0. 51 -0. 66 -0. 93 -0. 09 -0. 99 -0. 22 
2 -0. 45 -1. 11 -0. 83 0. 48 -0. 51 1. 10 
3 -0.71 -1.82 -1.31 -0. 86 -1.37 -1.98*** 
4 -0. 09 -1.91 -0. 16 -0. 52 -1.89 -1.20 
5 -0. 34 -2. 24 -0. 63 -0. 33 -2. 22 -0. 76 
6 -0. 19 -2. 43 -0. 35 0. 43 -1.79 0. 98 
7 0. 77 -1.66 1.43 0. 10 -1.69 0. 24 
8 -0. 33 -2. 00 -0. 61 0. 29 -1.40 0. 66 
9 -0. 31 -2. 31 -0. 57 -0. 02 -1.42 -0. 04 
10 0. 07 -2. 24 0. 13 -0. 32 -1.74 -0. 74 
(continued on next page) 
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Table 5.3 (continued) 
Panel B: Mean cumulative prediction errors (in percent), proportion 
of positive returns and test statistic over various 
intervals around the announcement date 
Cash Non-Cash 










-50 to 0 0. 98 0. 50 -0. 24 5. 16 0. 58 1.73* ** *** 
-10 to 0 -0. 15 0. 42 -0. 20 -0. 90 0. 42 -0. 87 
-5 to 0 -0. 41 0. 50 -0. 49 0. 30 0. 55 0. 37 
-2 to 0 -0. 02 0. 58 0. 08 0. 24 0. 48 0. 82 
-1 to 0 -0. 99 0. 33 -1.07 0. 32 0. 51 1.00 
+ 1 to +5 -2. 09 0. 25 -1.52 -1.32 0. 32 -1.84*** 
-5 to +5 -2. 50 0. 33 -1.39 -1.02 0. 38 -0. 96 
-10 to + 10 -2. 24 0. 42 -0. 83 -1.74 0. 35 -1.43 
* significant at the one percent level 
** significant at the five percent level 
** significant at the ten percent level 
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Table 5.4 
Comparison of asset-for-asset exchanges in which the transaction’s 
value was/was not provided at the time of the announcement. 




given Transaction price not given 
n=31 
PE CPE t PE CPE t 
-10 -0. 57% -0. 57% -1. 14 -0. 12% -0. 12 -0. 27 
-9 0. 35 -0. 22 0. 70 -0. 42 -0. 54 -0. 95 
-8 0. 38 0. 16 0. 76 -0. 27 -0. 81 -0. 60 
-7 -0. 21 -0. 05 -0. 41 0. 11 -0. 70 0. 24 
-6 -0. 08 -0. 13 -0. 16 -0. 35 -1. 05 -0. 78 
-5 -0. 03 -0. 16 -0. 07 0. 31 -0. 74 0. 69 
-4 -1. 46 -1. 62 -3. 01** 0. 02 -0. 72 0. 05 
-3 0. 26 -1. 36 0. 52 0. 06 -0. 66 0. 12 
-2 1. 16 -0. 20 2. 36** -0. 15 -0. 81 -0. 34 
-1 0. 68 0. 48 1. 35 0. 48 -0. 33 1. 08 
0 -0. 85 -0. 37 -1. 71 -0. 48 -0. 81 -1. 08 
1 -0. 48 -0. 85 -0. 96 -0. 09 -0. 90 -0. 20 
2 -0. 99 -1. 84 -2. 0. 75 -0. 15 1. 70 
3 -0. 60 -2. 44 -1. 19 -0. 91 -1. 06 -2. 08** 
4 -0. 41 -2. 85 -0. 81 -0. 40 -1. 46 -0. 91 
5 -0. 70 -3. 54 -1. 39 -0. 18 -1. 64 -0. 40 
6 -0. 15 -3. 69 -0. 29 0. 43 -1. 21 0. 97 
7 0. 94 -2. 75 1. gg*** 0. 01 -1. 20 0. 02 
8 0. 12 -2. 63 0. 24 0. 12 -1. 08 0. 26 
9 -0. 28 -2. 91 -0. 56 -0. 02 -1. 10 -0. 04 
10 0. 08 -2. 83 0. 16 -0. 34 -1. 44 -0. 77 
(continued on next page) 
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Table 5.4 (continued) 
Panel B: Mean cumulative prediction errors (in percent), proportion 
of positive returns and test statistic over various 
intervals around the announcement date. 
Transaction price 
n=12 > 












-50 to 0 1.02 0. 50 0. 34 5. 26 0. 61 1.47 
-10 to 0 -0. 37 0. 33 -0. 31 -0. 81 0. 42 -0. 99 
-5 to 0 -0. 24 0. 33 -0. 60 0. 24 0. 55 -0. 11 
-2 to 0 0. 99 0. 58 1.31 -0. 15 0. 45 -0. 04 
-1 to 0 -0. 17 0. 58 0. 33 0. 00 0. 45 0. 41 
+ 1 to +5 -3. 17 0. 08 -2.61* -0. 83 0. 38 -0. 96 
-5 to +5 -3. 41 0. 25 -2.20** -0. 59 0. 38 -0. 72 
-10 to + 10 -2. 83 0. 25 -1.03 -1.44 0. 35 -1. 18 
* significant at the one percent level 
** significant at the five percent level 
*** significant at the ten percent level 
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Table 5.5 
Average prediction errors for the sample of forty-three firms 
undertaking asset-for-asset exchanges: Returns on the NASDAQ Index 
were used as a proxy for the market return. 
Panel A: Daily average and cumulative prediction errors. 
DAY PE CPE t-statistic 
-10 -0.10% -0.10% -0. 26 
-9 -0. 26 -0. 36 -0. 71 
-8 0. 05 -0. 31 0. 13 
-7 0. 07 -0. 24 0. 20 
-6 -0. 38 -0. 62 -1.04 
-5 0. 21 -0. 41 0. 58 
-4 -0. 26 -0. 67 -0. 70 
-3 0. 12 -0. 55 0. 33 
-2 0. 15 -0. 39 0. 41 
-1 0. 44 0. 05 1. 18 
0 -0. 44 -0. 39 -1. 19 
1 -0. 17 -0. 56 -0. 45 
2 0. 33 -0. 23 0. 90 
3 -0. 85 -1.08 -2.37** 
4 -0. 42 -1.50 -1. 13 
5 -0. 31 -1.81 -0. 84 
6 0. 34 -1.47 0. 91 
7 0. 25 -1.22 0. 67 
8 0. 15 -1.07 0. 39 
9 -0. 15 -1.22 -0. 40 
10 -0. 28 -1.51 -0. 76 
(continued on next page) 
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Table 5.5(continued) 
Panel B: Mean cumulative prediction errors (in percent), proportion 
of positive returns and the z-statistic over various 







-50 to 0 4. 32 0. 63 1.50 
-10 to 0 -0. 39 0. 47 -0. 64 
-5 to 0 0. 23 0. 53 0. 06 
-2 to 0 0. 15 0. 47 0. 25 
-1 to 0 0. 00 0. 49 0. 51 
+ 1 to +5 -1. 10 0. 35 -2.26** 
-5 to +5 -0. 87 0. 47 -1.48 
-10 to + 10 -1.21 0. 35 -1.49 
** significant at the five percent level 
*** significant at the ten percent level 
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Table 5.6 
Average prediction errors for the sample of forty-three firms 
undertaking asset-for-asset exchanges: Returns on the S&P 500 Index 
were used as a proxy for the market return. 
Panel A: Daily average and cumulative prediction errors. 
DAY PE CPE t-statistic 
-10 -0.26% -0.26% -0. 69 
-9 -0. 20 -0. 45 -0. 53 
-8 -0. 12 -0. 57 -0. 33 
-7 0. 03 -0. 55 0. 07 
-6 -0.27 -0. 82 -0. 74 
-5 0. 20 -0. 62 0. 55 
-4 -0. 40 -1.02 -1.09 
-3 0. 14 -0. 88 0. 36 
-2 0. 20 -0. 69 0. 53 
-1 0. 53 -0. 16 1.42 
0 -0. 64 -0. 80 -1.74 
1 -0. 18 -0. 98 -0. 49 
2 0. 22 -0. 76 0. 60 
3 -0. 81 -1.57 -2.24** 
4 -0. 39 -1.96 -1.06 
5 -0. 34 -2. 30 -0. 91 
6 0. 24 -2. 06 0. 63 
7 0. 29 -1.77 0. 78 
8 0. 14 -1.63 0. 38 
9 -0. 09 -1.72 -0. 23 
10 -0. 21 -1.93 -0. 56 
(continued on next page) 
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Table 5.6 (continued) 
Panel B: Mean cumulative prediction errors (in percent), proportion 
of positive returns and the z-statistic over various 







-50 to 0 3. 87 0. 53 1.25 
-10 to 0 -0.79 0. 42 -0. 96 
-5 to 0 0. 02 0. 49 -0. 06 
-2 to 0 0. 08 0. 42 0. 56 
-1 to 0 -0. 11 0. 42 0. 10 
+1 to +5 -1. 10 0.30 -2.22** 
-5 to +5 -1.08 0. 42 -1.54 
-10 to +10 -1. 58 0. 35 -1.64 
** significant at the five percent level 
*** significant at the ten percent level 
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Table 5.7 
Average prediction errors for the sample of forty-three firms 
undertaking asset-for-asset exchanges using the market adjusted 
returns methodology to calculate abnormal returns. 
Panel A: Daily average and cumulative prediction errors. 
DAY PE CPE t-statistic 
-10 -0.22% -0.22% -0. 61 
-9 -0. 06 -0. 27 -0. 16 
-8 -0. 07 -0. 34 -0. 20 
-7 0. 03 -0. 32 0. 08 
-6 -0. 25 -0. 57 -0. 71 
-5 0. 16 -0. 41 0. 46 
-4 -0. 25 -0. 66 -0. 71 
-3 0. 09 -0. 56 0. 26 
-2 0. 25 -0. 31 0. 71 
-1 0. 54 0. 23 1.53 
0 -0. 64 -0. 41 -1.84** *** 
1 -0. 27 -0. 68 -0. 75 
2 0. 26 -0. 42 0. 74 
3 -0. 71 -1. 12 -2.02*** 
4 -0. 28 -1.40 -0. 78 
5 -0. 23 -1.63 -0. 65 
6 0. 35 -1.29 0. 97 
7 0.29 -1.00 0. 80 
8 0. 14 -0. 87 0. 38 
9 -0.06 -0. 93 -0. 18 
10 -0. 19 -1. 12 -0. 52 
Panel B: Mean cumulative prediction errors (in percent) and the 
z-statistic over various intervals around the announcement 
date. 
Interval CPE z 
(%) statistic 
-10 to 0 -0. 41 -0. 50 
-5 to 0 0. 16 0. 08 
-2 to 0 0. 15 0. 63 
-1 to 0 -0. 10 0. 08 
+ 1 to +5 -1. 22 -2.09* 
** significant at the five percent level 
*** significant at the ten percent level 
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Table 5.8 
^rnge prediction errors for a sample of thirty-nine firms 
undertaking assec-fcr-asset exchanges with the betas estimated using 
a pest-event interval. 
Pane1 A Daily average and cumulative prediction errors. 
DAY PE CPE t-statistic 
-10 -0.41% -0.41% -1. 13 
-9 -0.22 -0.64 -0.62 
-S -0.07 -0.70 -0. 18 
_ —* 0. 10 -0.61 0.26 
—6 -0.32 -0.93 -0.89 
-5 0. 16 -0.78 0. 43 
-0.11 -0. 88 -0.29 
-3 0.08 -0.80 0.23 
-2 0.04 -0.75 0. 12 
0.39 -0.37 1.06 
0 -0.60 -0. 97 -1.68*** 
1 -0.26 -1.23 -0.72 
2 0.26 -0.97 0. 71 
3 -0.72 -1.69 -2.01*** 
4 -0.34 -2. 04 -0. 95 
5 -0.38 -2. 42 -1.05 
6 0.33 -2. 09 0. 90 
7 0.26 -1.82 0. 73 
8 0.23 -1.59 0. 64 
9 -0. 04 -1.63 -0. 11 
10 -0.28 -1. 91 -0. 78 
Panel B: Kean cumulative prediction errors (in percent), proportion 
of positive returns and the z-statistic over various 





-10 to 0 -0. 97 -0. 48 
-5 to 0 -0.04 0. 69 
-2 to 0 -0. 17 -0. 19 
-1 to 0 -0. 21 -0. 36 
+1 to +5 -1.45 -2.53** 
** significant at the five percent level 




ion err::= : :r 
in f*etS af' rT -— -r rr 
e cf nineteen firms 
asset exchang e. 
that 
A - iy emulative predict irr. errors. 
~iV PE CPE t-statistic 
_1 o -0. 17% -0. 17% -0.27 
—9 -0. IS -0.34 -0.28 
— ^ 0.97 0.63 1.5S 
_*7 0. 24 0. 87 0.39 
—6 0. 36 1.23 0.5S 
-5 0.79 2.02 1.27 
_ -0.28 1.74 -0.46 
-3 0.00 1.74 0.00 
-2 0. 14 1.87 0.22 
0.53 2.40 0. 85 
0 -0.40 2.00 -0.64 
1 -0.26 1.74 -0.42 
2 -0.61 1.13 -0.99 
3 -0.82 0.31 -1.33 
4 -0.44 -0. 13 -0.71 
5 -0.32 -0. 44 -0.51 
6 -0.13 -0. 57 -0.21 
7 0.96 0.40 1.57 
8 0.09 0.48 0. 14 
9 -0.29 0. 19 -0. 47 
10 -0.37 -0. 18 -0. 59 
(continued on next page) 
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Table 5.° (^continued) 
Panel B: yfean cumulative prediction errors (in percent), proportion 
of positive returns and the z-statistic over various 







-50 to 0 9. OS 0.63 2.64* 
-10 to 0 2.00 0. 63 1.75*** 
-5 to 0 0.73 0. 53 1.07 
-2 to 0 0.27 0. 47 1.21 
-1 to 0 0. 13 0.42 0. 54 
+1 to +5 -1.56 0.21 -2.99* 
-5 to +5 -1.67 0.37 -1.23 
-10 to + 10 -0. 18 0. 47 0. 18 
* significant at 
** significant at 
*** significant at 
the one percent level 
the five percent level 
the ten percent level 
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Table 5.10 
Average prediction errors for the subsample of twenty-four firms 
:ha: had a decrease in beta after an asset-for-asset exchange. 
Panel A: Daily average and cumulative prediction errors. 
DAY PE CPE t-statistic 
-10 -0.28% -0.28 -0. 56 
-9 -0.35 -0.63 -0. 69 
-8 -1. 19 -1.82 -2.44** 
-7 -0.24 -2. 06 -0. 48 
—6 -0.75 -2. 80 -1.51 
-5 -0.07 -2. 88 -0. 14 
-4 -0.07 -2. 95 -0. 14 
-3 0. 19 -2. 76 0. 38 
-2 -0.43 -3. 19 -0. 86 
-1 1. 17 -2.01 2.40** 
0 -0.58 -2.60 -1. 17 
1 -0. 16 -2.76 -0. 32 
2 0. 93 -1.83 1.89*** 
3 -0. 80 -2.63 -1.61 
4 -0. 52 -3. 14 -1.04 
5 -0. 19 -3. 34 -0. 38 
6 0.80 -2. 54 1.61 
7 -0.05 -2.58 -0. 09 
8 0.02 -2. 57 0.03 
9 -0. 10 -2. 67 -0. 20 
10 -0.26 -2.92 -0. 51 
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Dollar abnormal returns over different intervals around the 
announcement date for all firms undertaking asset-for-asset 
exchanges and subsamples that did/did not receive cash and did/did 
not announce the value of the transaction. 
Panel A: Dollar returns in 





in parentheses give 






n=42 n=12 n=30 n=31 n=ll 
-50 to 0 -15. 0 88. 5 -59. 4 -105.8 273. 2 
(0.55) (0.50) (0.55) (0.55) (0.45) 
-10 to 0 -20. 9 37. 3 -44. 2 -39. 9 29. 5 
(0.43) (0.42) (0.43) (0.43) (0.45) 
-5 to 0 43. 6 166. 5 -5. 6 -26. 0 271.0 
(0.55) (0.50) (0.57) (0.57) (0.55) 
-2 to 0 85. 5 174. 5 49. 9 38. 3 247. 4 
(0.52) (0.58) (0.50) (0.47) (0.72) 
-1 to 0 57. 8 87. 1 46. 1 43. 6 114. 1 
(0.48) (0.33) (0.53) (0.47) (0.55) 
-1 26. 8 20. 9 29. 1 25. 4 36. 4 
(0.57) (0.50) (0.60) (0.57) (0.63) 
0 31.0 66. 2 17. 0 18. 2 77. 7 
(0.40) (0.41) (0.40) (0.40) (0.45) 
+ 1 -28. 4 -41.4 -23. 2 -31. 1 -27. 4 
(0.48) (0.50) (0.47) (0.50) (0.36) 
+1 to +5 -58.1* -65.8** -55.1** -50.9** -91.5** 
(0.31) (0.25) (0.33) (0.37) (0.09) 
-5 to +5 -14.5** 100. 8 -60.6*** -76.9** 179. 6 
(0.38) (0.33) (0.40) (0.37) (0.36) 
-10 to + 10 -94. 5 19. 8 -140.2 -122.7*** -33. 2 
(0.36) (0.42) (0.33) (0.33) (0.36) 
(continued on next page) 
* significant at the one percent level 
** significant at the five percent level 
*** significant at the ten percent level 
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Table 5.11 (continued) 
Panel B : Dollar value of Equity ($ millions). 






Mean 4158 6901 3096 3335 6285 
Median 1229 1024 1296 1229 1057 
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Table 5.12 
Average prediction errors for the subsample of the twenty-two 
largest firms in the sample of asset-for-asset exchanges. 
Panel A: Daily average and cumulative prediction errors. 
DAY PE CPE t-statistic 
-10 0. 13% 0. 13% 0. 35 
-9 -0. 12 0. 00 -0. 33 
-8 0. 13 0. 14 0. 35 
-7 -0. 22 -0. 08 -0. 58 
-6 -0. 25 -0. 33 -0.67 
-5 -0. 22 -0. 55 -0. 60 
-4 -0. 21 -0. 76 -0. 57 
-3 0. 17 -0. 59 0. 46 
-2 0. 16 -0. 43 0. 44 
-1 0. 18 -0. 25 0. 48 
0 0. 91 0. 66 2.51** 
1 -0. 23 0. 43 -0. 61 
2 -0. 62 -0. 19 -1.68 
3 -0. 50 -0. 69 -1.36 
4 -0. 42 -1. 11 -1. 14 
5 -0. 20 -1.31 -0. 53 
6 -0. 09 -1.40 -0. 25 
7 0. 36 -1.03 0. 99 
8 -0. 11 -1. 14 -0. 30 
9 -0. 30 -1.45 -0. 82 
10 -0. 23 -1.68 -0. 62 
(continued on next page) 
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Table 5.12 (continued) 
Panel B: Mean cumulative prediction errors (in percent), proportion 
of positive returns and the z-statistic over various 







-50 to 0 0. 14 0. 50 -0. 43 
-10 to 0 0. 66 0. 41 0. 39 
-5 to 0 0. 99 0. 50 0. 83 
-2 to 0 1.25 0. 55 2.10** 
-1 to 0 1.09 0. 50 1.67 
+ 1 to +5 -1.97 0. 23 -2.12** 
-5 to +5 -0. 98 0. 27 -0. 81 
-10 to + 10 -1.68 0. 37 -1.58 
** significant at the five percent level 
*** significant at the ten percent level 
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Table 5.13 
Average prediction errors for the subsample of the twenty-one 
smallest firms in the sample of asset-for-asset exchanges. 
Panel A: Daily average and cumulative prediction errors. 
DAY PE CPE t-statistic 
-10 -0.64% -0.64% -0. 91 
-9 -0. 29 -0. 93 -0. 41 
-8 -0. 31 -1.24 -0. 44 
-7 0. 27 -0. 98 0. 38 
-6 -0.30 -1.28 -0. 43 
-5 0. 67 -0. 61 0. 95 
-4 -0. 58 -1. 18 -0. 82 
-3 0. 05 -1. 13 0. 08 
-2 0. 27 -0. 86 0. 38 
-1 0. 91 0. 05 1.30 
0 -2. 14 -2. 09 -3.20* 
1 -0. 19 -2. 28 -0. 27 
2 1. 16 -1. 12 1.66 
3 -1. 16 -2. 29 -1.67 
4 -0. 38 -2. 67 -0. 55 
5 -0. 49 -3. 16 -0. 69 
6 0. 65 -2.51 0. 92 
7 0. 20 -2. 31 0. 29 
8 0. 37 -1.93 0. 53 
9 0. 13 -1.81 0. 18 
10 -0. 20 -2. 01 -0. 28 
(continued on next page) 
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Table 5.13 (continued) 
Panel B: Mean cumulative prediction errors (in percent), proportion 
of positive returns and the z-statistic over various 







-50 to 0 7. 45 0.57 1.75*** 
-10 to 0 -2.09 0. 38 -1.77*** 
-5 to 0 -0. 81 0. 52 -1.41 
-2 to 0 -0. 96 0.43 -1.55 
-1 to 0 -1.23 0.38 -2.05** 
+1 to +5 -1.07 0. 43 -0. 66 
-5 to +5 -1.88 0.48 -1.49 
-10 to +10 -2.01 0. 38 -1.07 
* significant at 
** significant at 
*** significant at 
the one percent level 
the five percent level 
the ten percent level 
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Table 5.14 
Results for regression of returns on proportion of assets divested. 
Ret = a + (3 * Prop 
where: 
Ret= Percentage or Dollar abnormal returns during an interval 
Prop= Dollar value of transaction as a proportion of dollar 
value of the firm’s assets. 
Interval a 3 t-statistic F-statistic Adj. R2 
Percentage Returns 
-1 to 0 0.00413 0.01498 0.014 0.01 -0.12 
-1 -0.00287 0.14284 5.438* 29.57* 0.76 
0 0.00700 -0.12784 -1.134 1.28 0.03 
1 to +5 -0.02292 -0.15827 -1.054 1.11 0.01 
Dollar Returns 
-l 55. 3 -196.4 -0.365 0.13 0.01 
* significant at the one percent level. 
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Table 5.15 
Average prediction errors for a value-weighted portfolio of thirteen 
matched pairs of firms undertaking asset-for-asset exchanges. 
Panel A: Daily average and cumulative prediction errors. The dollar 
equity values six days prior to day 0 were used as the 
weights. 
DAY PE CPE t-statistic 
-5 -0.07% -0.14% -0. 16 
-4 -0. 76 -0. 91 -1.75 
-3 -0. 08 -0. 99 -0. 19 
-2 -0.01 -1.00 -0. 03 
-1 -0. 33 -1.33 -0. 75 
0 -0. 73 -2. 06 -1.67 
1 -0. 20 -2. 27 -0. 46 
2 0. 15 -2. 11 0. 35 
3 -0. 33 -2. 44 -0. 75 
4 -0. 52 -2. 96 -1. 18 
5 -0. 83 -3. 79 -1.91*** 
Panel B: Cumulative prediction errors and z-statistic for portfolios 
of matched pairs of firms undertaking an asset-for-asset 
exchange. 
Interval CPE z-statistic 
-5 to 0 -1.99 -2.08** 
-2 to 0 -1.07 -1.33 
-1 to 0 -1.06 -1.96** 
+ 1 to +5 -1.73 -2.35** 
** significant at the five percent level 
*** significant at the ten percent level 
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Table 5.16 
Frequency distribution of positive and negative cumulative 
prediction errors for thirteen matched pairs of firms carrying out 
asset-for-asset exchanges. 
Interval Both Positive Both Negative One Positive 
-50 to 0 4 2 7 
-10 to 0 1 4 8 
-5 to 0 3 3 7 
-2 to 0 4 6 3 
-1 to 0 2 5 6 
-1 4 4 5 
0 1 5 7 
+ 1 4 5 4 
+ 1 to +5 3 8 2 
-5 to +5 1 7 5 
-10 to + 10 0 8 5 
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CHAPTER 6 
RESULTS FOR ASSET-FOR-STOCK EXCHANGES 
We examine the stock price reaction at the time of the 
announcement for divestors, acquirers and portfolios of matched 
pairs of divestors and acquirers. In addition, we examine dollar 
returns at the time of announcement. We also identify and study 
factors that could possibly explain the division of gains between 
divestors and acquirers. The factors studied are: 
1. Appointment of directors on the acquirer’s board. 
2. Use of convertible securities versus the use of straight stock. 
3. Restrictions on stock. 
4. Influence of cash as a part of the consideration. 
5. Financial condition of the divested unit. 
6. Relatedness of assets. 
7. Relationship of gains to the percentage of stock acquired. 
6.1 Announcement Effects 
For a sample of 95 divestors, Table 6.1 reveals that the mean 
abnormal return during the interval from days -1 to 0 was 1.03% 
(z=3.37, p=0.0%). The bulk of these gains arise on day -1, with an 
abnormal return of 1.14% (t=4.62, p=0.0%) and 64% positive 
prediction errors. These returns are generally similar in magnitude 
to the returns to divestors in sell-offs. An intriguing finding is 
the negative abnormal return of -1.37% (z=-2.55, p=l.1%, 35% 
positive) during the five-day period after the announcement. Further 
analysis to explore some reasons for this is presented later. 
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A sample of 107 acquirers (Table 6.2) had gains of 1.47% 
(z=5.44, p=0.0%) during the two-day announcement period. These are 
generally higher than the gains to acquirers in cash transactions. 
The acquirers also had positive abnormal returns during most 
intervals around the announcement date. Gains to acquirers start 
accruing a few days prior to the announcement. In the period from 
days -5 to 0 the gains were 3.63% (z=6.03, p=0.0%), with over 64% of 
firms having positive abnormal returns. Unlike divestors, the 
acquirers had positive abnormal returns during the period from days 
-50 to 0 and did not show evidence of any negative abnormal returns 
in the post-event period. 
As in the case of asset-for-asset exchanges, since we have both 
OTC and Exchange listed firms in our sample, the results were 
confirmed by employing alternative proxies for the market return. 
The results were not materially different when returns on the S&P 
500 and NASDAQ indexes were used. An examination of betas during 
days -200 to -51 and days +51 to +200 relative to the transaction 
did not reveal any evidence of changes in betas as a result of an 
asset-for-stock exchange. The use of post-event betas to estimate 
the market model parameters did not lead to materially different 
results. 
6.2 Dollar Returns 
Table 6.3 gives data on average dollar abnormal returns to 
divestors and acquirers during different intervals. The two-day 
dollar return of $31.7 million (median= $2.08 million) for divestors 
during days -1 to 0 was significant at the five percent level. Since 
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the distribution of dollar returns is skewed, the non-parametric ' 
Wilcoxon Signed-ranks test was employed to test for significance. 
During the same period acquirers had dollar gains of $20.8 million. 
Though this was not significant at any of the conventional levels, 
the dollar gains to acquirers over the interval from days -5 to 0 of 
$32.9 million (median= $1.6 million) were significant at the one 
percent level. Though the acquirers had lower dollar abnormal 
returns during days -1 to 0, as a percentage of the median market 
value of equity these were higher than dollar returns to divestors. 
Keeping in view the fact that these transactions involve only a part 
of the firm’s assets, these dollar returns are fairly large when 
compared to those earned by participants in complete takeovers. 
6.3 Results for Matched Pairs of Firms 
We also examined returns to matched pairs of divestors and 
acquirers by forming value-weighted portfolios. Of the 136 firms in 
sixty-eight matched pairs, 100 were exchange listed (56 divestors) 
and 36 were OTC firms (12 divestors). Thus there was a higher 
percentage of OTC acquirers in the set of firms that belonged to 
matched pairs. The divestors in these pairs had a mean transaction 
value of $285 million and a mean equity value of $2701 million. 
These were not very different in size from the divestors in the 
complete sample. However, the acquirers with a mean transaction 
value of $289 million and a mean market value of equity of $678 
million were smaller than the acquirers in the complete sample, 
which may be due to the higher percentage of OTC firms in this 
subsample. 
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The pattern of returns to both divestors and acquirers forming 
these pairs were similar to those in the complete sample. Divestors 
had an abnormal return of 0.86% (z=2.54, p=l.1%) during the interval 
from days -1 to 0 and -1.31% (z=-2.05, p=4.0%) during days +1 to +5. 
Acquirers in this sample gained 2.36% (z=5.51, p=0.0%) during the 
two-day period days -1 to 0. 
For a portfolio of sixty-eight matched pairs (Table 6.4) we 
observed cumulative abnormal returns of 0.96% (z=3.11, p=0.2%) over 
days -1 to 0. Over the period days -5 to 0, the returns to 
portfolios of matched pairs were higher at 1.81% (z=3.64, p=0.0%). 
This suggests that asset-for-stock exchanges lead to the creation of 
wealth for the firms involved. We further examined the division of 
gains between acquirers and divestors. As shown in Table 6.5, during 
the interval days -1 to 0 both firms gained in only 25 out of 68 
pairs. In 10 pairs both firms lost and the other pairs showed gains 
to only one out of the two firms. This evidence suggests the 
possibility of wealth redistribution between divestors and 
acquirers. While the exchange leads to an increase in wealth for the 
two firms combined, the gains are not generally shared by both firms 
involved in the exchange. This suggests that these exchanges are not 
driven purely by synergistic considerations. 
6.4 Results for Subsamples 
With the objective of explaining the causes for the valuation 
effect of asset-for-stock exchanges for divestors and acquirers, we 
examine results for various subsamples of firms. 
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6.4.1 Directors Appointed 
While an asset-for-stock exchange does not result in a complete 
takeover, the divestor can exercise control by appointing directors 
on the acquirer’s board. Combined with the possibility that a well 
informed investor is buying a block of equity, this is expected to 
send a positive signal about the acquirer’s value. The results for 
acquirers are given in Table 6.6 and for divestors in Table 6.7. 
Twenty-one acquirers who had directors nominated by the divestor had 
an abnormal return of 3.68% during the period days -1 to 0 (z=5.46, 
p=0.0%, 57% positive returns) and 4.76% (z=5.34, p=0.0%) during days 
-2 to 0. Since the subsample had 21 firms, we also conducted a 
Binomial Sign Test to check if a significant number of abnormal 
returns were positive. This did not suggest that the number of 
positive and negative abnormal returns were statistically different. 
The average percentage of stock involved in these cases was 42.5% 
(median= 36.7%). For the sample of eighty-six acquirers for whom the 
divestor did not nominate any directors, the abnormal returns in the 
interval days -1 to 0 were 0.93% (z=3.36, p=0.0%) and during days -2 
to 0 were 1.68% (z=4.09, p=0.0%). In this subsample, the average 
stock held by the divestor was 15.5% (median= 10.0%). The gains to 
acquirers were higher in case directors were appointed. Also, 
divestors who appointed directors had a higher percentage of stock 
in the acquirer. 
The twenty-one divestors who appointed their nominees to the 
board of the acquirer had abnormal returns of 2.70% (z=2.98, p=0.3%) 
during days -1 to 0 and -0.83% (z=-0.58, p=56.2%) during days +1 to 
109 
+5. The returns to divestors who did not appoint directors were 
0.56% (z=2.23, p=2.6%) during days -1 to 0, and -1.54% (z=-2.57, 
p=1.0%) during days +1 to +5. The results indicate that while both 
groups of divestors lose in the five-day post-announcement period, 
the losses are significant only for divestors who do not appoint 
directors. The divestors who appoint directors generally have higher 
returns over all intervals than those who do not appoint directors. 
Appointment of directors could indicate that the possibility of a 
complete takeover increases in future. For divestors, the market 
seems to have a negative view in case the transaction results in a 
lack of control in the decision making process of the acquirer or 
the divested assets. 
6.4.2 Form of Stock Used as Means of Payment 
In nineteen cases, the acquirer’s payment for the assets was in 
the form of convertible securities rather than straight stock. Table 
6.8 shows that for these acquirers the abnormal return during the 
interval from days -1 to 0 was only 0.19% (z=0.89, p=37.3%). The 
return for the interval from days -2 to 0 was 0.80% (z=1.31, 
p=19.0%). The Binomial Sign Test does not show any support for the 
fact that the number of positive abnormal returns was different from 
the number of negative abnormal returns. However, the eighty-eight 
acquirers who exchanged straight stock had abnormal returns of 1.74% 
(z=5.58, p=0.0%) during days -1 to 0, and 2.60% (z=6.04, p=0.0%) 
during the interval from days -2 to 0. This suggests that only the 
i 
exchange of straight stock leads to gains to acquirers. As shown in 
Table 6.9, the returns to divestors do not differ substantially 
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whether they ge* (Convertible or straight stock, although the returns 
are acre significant for the straight stock subsample. If a Binomial 
Sign Test is used, the divestors do not have significant gains in 
the announcement period, but have significant negative abnormal 
returns in the five days after the date of announcement. Thus, the 
gains to acquirers arise due the divestor gaining some degree of 
control in the acquirer. In case the medium of payment is straight 
stock, acquirers returns are positive and the pattern is similar to 
that cf targets In takeovers. 
6.4.3 Restrictions on Stock 
In a number of cases restrictions were imposed on the voting 
rights of the divestor or on the resale of stock. This has 
interesting implications for transfer of control to the divestor. If 
the gains arise due to obtaining control over the acquirer, we would 
expect lower gains to divestors who get restricted stock. Table 6.10 
shows that the fifteen divestors who got restricted stock had gains 
of 4.43% (z=4.75, p=0.0%) during the period from days -1 to 0. 2 The 
gains to divestors obtaining non-restricted stock were 0.40% 
(z=1.62, p=10.5%) during the same interval. Surprisingly, the post¬ 
announcement period decline in returns is significant only for 
divestors obtaining non-restricted stock. The divestors getting 
restricted stock had abnormal returns of -0.82% (z=-0.72, p=47.2%, 
33% positive) and those getting non-restricted stock had abnormal 
returns of -1.49% (z=-2.46, p=1.4%, 35% positive) over the interval 
from days +1 to +5. 
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Out of the 80 cases where non-restricted stock was used, 
directors were appointed by the divestors in 17 cases. In the 15 
transactions where restricted stock was given, directors were 
appointed in 4 cases. These results suggest that divestors who do 
not appoint directors or those who get non-restricted stock lose in 
the post-announcement period from days +1 to +5. The negative 
returns to divestors in case they have full voting rights are in 
some respects similar to the returns to acquirers in takeovers. 
On the other hand, as shown in Table 6.11, acquirers that place 
restrictions have negative abnormal returns of -1.59% (z=-3.67, 
p=0.0%) during the interval from days -1 to 0, as against gains of 
2.04% (z=7.52, p=0.0%) for those giving non-restricted stock. This 
is similar to the findings of Dann and DeAngelo (1983) and Bradley 
and Wakeman (1983) in their studies on Standstill Agreements. Dann 
and DeAngelo observed that when accompanied by repurchase, 
Standstill Agreements result in abnormal returns of -4.10% for a 
sample of 19 firms. Acquirers giving non-restricted stock have 
higher abnormal returns over all intervals examined by us. Together 
with the results for acquirers that give straight stock, these 
results suggests that acquirers benefit due to the partial transfer 
of control. 
6.4.4 The Role of Cash 
Sometimes cash forms a part of the consideration along with 
3 
stock. An examination of firms that obtain some cash may provide 
evidence on the role of the liquidity motive in these exchanges. As 
shown in Table 6.12, only divestors that obtain some cash along with 
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stock gain during the announcement period from days -1 to 0. As 
against the abnormal gains of 2.26% (z=3.93, p=0.0%) to those 
getting cash, the non-cash subsample of fifty-one divestors had 
insignificant returns during this interval. However, the negative 
abnormal return during days + 1 to +5 was significant only for the 
cash subsample, although the percentage of negative returns in the 
two subsamples were not very different. Table 6.13 provides similar 
results for acquirers. Acquirers giving cash along with stock had 
abnormal gains of 1.92% (z=6.05, p=0.0%) during days -1 to 0. The 
non-cash subsample had lower gains of 1.05% (z=1.74, p=8.2%) during 
the same period. 
Rather than just looking at the existence of cash in the 
consideration, looking at cash as a proportion of total proceeds may 
provide a clearer picture. We subdivided our sample into groups in 
which stock formed fifty percent or more of the total proceeds and 
where stock was less than half the total. Acquirers giving more than 
a fifty percent stock payment had returns of 1.01% (z=1.76, p=7.8%) 
during the period from days -1 to 0. Those paying mainly cash had 
returns of 2.54% (z=7.02, p=0.0%) during the same period. Although 
acquirers paying mainly stock did not lose, our results agree with 
Travlos’s finding that a stock offer signals overvaluation while a 
cash offer signals undervaluation of acquirer’s stock. The slightly 
higher returns to acquirers making a part cash payment may also 
reflect lower Earnings Per Share dilution. 
Table 6.14 gives the results for divestors for the two 
subsamples where stock and cash formed the majority of the 
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consideration. During the period from days -1 to 0, divestors who 
got mainly cash had insignificant returns. In fact, a significant 
positive return of 1.34% (z=3.80, p=0.0%) on day -1 was followed by 
a significant negative return of -1.46% (z=-2.67, p=0.8%) on day 0. 
Any positive effects of the divestiture are lost during the post¬ 
announcement period. The abnormal return during days +1 to +5 was 
-1.97% (z=-2.62, p=0.9%). Divestors obtaining mainly stock had 
significant positive returns of 1.87% (z=3.50, p=0.0%) during the 
announcement period from days -1 to 0. Their post-event period 
returns were negative insignificant. While the day -1 returns are 
similar in both subsamples, the post-announcement period negative 
return is significant only in the subsample of divestors that got 
mainly cash as the consideration. 
It is possible that divestors who received cash had liquidity 
problems or needed cash to reduce debt. In that case, divesting 
assets could send a positive signal to the market, while retention 
of partial control through stock in the acquirer or obtaining cash 
may send a negative signal leading to the negative post-event 
returns. Of the 13 divestors that sold loss making units, 9 got a 
partial cash payment. 
6.4.5 Financial Condition of the Divested Division 
If the divestiture results from pressure to sell a loss making 
division one would, expect lower gains to divestors. In distress 
sales the acquirer may be able to get a better deal, thus resulting 
in higher returns when such units are acquired. Acquiring a problem 
unit could also result in smaller gains due to taking over 
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unprofitable assets. We identified transactions where the divested 
unit was making losses from information provided in the Wall Street 
Journal or the Predicasts F&S Index. 
Acquiring non-loss making divisions results in slightly higher 
gains. However, as shown in Table 6.15, there is no major difference 
between the two subsamples of acquirers. Table 6.16 shows results 
for divestors selling loss making units. The small subsamples make 
any interpretation of these results difficult. Those selling non¬ 
loss making divisions had returns of 0.95% (z=2.94, p=0.3%) during 
the interval from days -1 to 0. The significant negative abnormal 
return of -1.39% (z=-2.12, p=3.4%) during days +1 to +5 for those 
divesting non-loss making units is similar in magnitude to the 
subsample of those divesting loss making units, though the results 
for the latter are not significant. 
An interesting finding is that out of the 13 divestors who sold 
unprofitable units, only 2 appointed directors on the acquirer’s 
board. Of these 13 transactions, in 11 cases the consideration was 
straight stock. There was no relationship between cash being a part 
of the consideration and the financial condition of the unit 
divested. 
6.4.6 Evidence on Related Assets 
In almost all transactions the acquired unit was related to the 
4 
existing operations of the acquirer. These were either product line 
extensions or the unit acquired was in the same business as the 
acquirer’s, although in a different geographic area. The evidence 
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for acquirers also supports the existing evidence in the literature 
on gains from acquiring related assets. 
6.4.7 Relationship of Gains to the Percentage of Stock Acquired 
We examined the relationship between the abnormal returns to 
divestors and acquirers and the percentage of stock acquired. Table 
6.17 shows the abnormal returns to divestors and acquirers during 
days -1 to 0 and days +1 to +5 at different levels of stock 
acquired. During the period days -1 to 0, divestors and acquirers 
had negative returns only in case the percentage of stock exchanged 
was less than 5%. The highest returns accrue to divestors who get 
between 25% to 50% of stock in the acquirer, and acquirers who give 
majority stockholding to divestors. Interestingly, acquirers lose if 
the stockholding exchanged is between 25% and 50%. All categories of 
divestors lose during the period from days +1 to +5. Acquirers lose 
during the five-day post-announcement period only if the percentage 
of stock acquired is lower than 25%. Combined with the results 
discussed earlier, these results suggest that gains to acquirers 
arise due to the transfer of control to the divestor. This is also 
borne out by the high returns to acquirers that pass on majority 
control to the divestors. 
Further evidence on this issue is provided by the series of 
regressions in Tables 6.18. We regressed the returns to divestors 
and acquirers over the interval from days -1 to 0 and day -1 on the 
percentage of stock acquired. The coefficient of the percentage of 
stock acquired was positive and significant only for acquirers for 
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day -1 =t tbe five percent level. This suggests higher returns to 
acquirers on day -1 as the percentage of stock acquired goes up. 
further examined the relationship between the level of stock 
acquired and the returns during these two intervals. Morck, Shleifer 
and Vishny examined the relationship between Tobin’s Q and 
management shareholding and observed a positive relationship between 
ownership and Q in the 0% to 5% shareholding range, a negative and 
less pronounced relationship in the 5% to 25% range, and a positive 
relationship above 25%. One interpretation of their results is the 
possibility of entrenchment by managers if stockholding is in the 5% 
to 25% range and convergence of interests of managers and other 
holders when managerial holding goes up over 25%. 
Similar to Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, we examined the 
relationship in ranges of up to 5%, 5% to 25% and over 25%. Table 
6.19 provides results for the piecewise linear ordinary least square 
regressions for the three ranges of stock acquired. When the stock 
acquired in an asset-for-stock exchange exceeds 5%, the divestor 
would have to make a disclosure to the SEC. The 25% level is 
selected based on the results of Morck et al. In the case of 
divestors, only the coefficient of S1 is significant at the five 
percent level when returns for day -1 are used. None of the other 
regressions were significant at any of the conventionally used 
levels. Though these results are not strong, they indicate a 
positive relationship between the abnormal returns and the 
percentage of stock acquired when the percentage increases to 5%. An 
insignificant negative relationship is observed when the percentage 
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rf mmsases bey mad 2S5L Fir acquirers the coefficient of S3 
- = post live am signif iram at me ten percent level when the 
acoinnal retnna on cay -1 is -sec in the regression. 
x— alternative specification cf the regression was run with the 
cvt turning pi inns being 2D% and 52%, At a 20% level of 
snoncni 1 mng me accounting rules allow the divestor to include a 
portion if rbe acquirer's profits in its income. At the 50% level 
■srority ownership passes on to the dives ter.5 
7eile 6.21 provides the results for this regression. For 
divestors, the coefficient cf 5. is significant at the five percent 
_eve1 when we use the return on day -1 in the regression. The 
coefficients of 5L and £3 are negative but insignificant in most 
regressions This suggests a weak positive relationship with 
abocmal returns as the stockholding increases to 20% and an 
insignificant negative relationship beyond that level. For 
acquirers, we observe a positive relationship till the 20% level, a 
negative insignificant relationship between the 20% to 50% levels 
and a positive insignificant relationship as the stock acquired 
increases beyond 50%. 
While the level of significance of the coefficients is not very 
high, an interpretation of these results would be that abnormal 
returns to divestors increase as their stockholding in the acquirer 
increases up to 20%. Beyond that level the relationship is 
insignificant negative. For acquirers, there is a positive 
relationship between abnormal returns and the percentage of stock 
acquired as the holding goes up to 20% and also for increases beyond 
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50%. Between 20% and 50% there is an insignificant negative 
relationship between the stockholding and the acquirer’s abnormal 
returns. One possibility could be that the acquirer’s returns 
increase upto the 20% level due to anticipation of a complete 
takeover and beyond 50% due to a virtual passing of control. 
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Table 6.1 
Average prediction errors for various days and intervals around the 
announcement of asset-for-stock exchanges for the sample of ninety- 
five divestors. 
Panel A: Daily average and cumulative prediction errors 
DAY PE CPE t-statistic 
-10 -0.04% -0.04% -0. 15 
-9 -0. 16 -0. 20 -0. 60 
-8 -0. 12 -0. 32 -0. 42 
-7 -0.32 -0. 65 -1. 18 
-6 -0. 44 -1.09 -1.62 
-5 0. 27 -0. 82 0. 98 
-4 0. 17 -0. 65 0. 60 
-3 0. 33 -0. 33 1.21 
-2 0. 26 -0. 07 0. 95 
-1 1. 14 1.07 4. 62* 
0 -0. 11 0. 97 -0. 39 
1 -0. 32 0. 65 -1. 15 
2 -0. 43 0. 22 -1.59 
3 -0. 38 -0. 16 -1.41 
4 -0. 43 -0. 60 -1.59 
5 0. 20 -0. 40 0. 73 
6 -0. 01 -0. 40 -0. 02 
7 0. 18 -0. 23 0. 65 
8 -0. 16 -0. 39 -0. 60 
9 -0. 50 -0. 89 -1.86 
10 -0. 23 -1. 12 -0. 84 
Panel B: Mean cumulative prediction errors (in percent), proportion 
of positive returns and the z-statistic over various 







-50 to 0 -0. 09 0. 50 0. 17 
-10 to 0 0. 97 0. 54 1.31 
-5 to 0 2. 06 0. 62 3.33* 
-2 to 0 1.29 0. 63 3. 26* 
-1 to 0 1.03 0. 60 3.37* 
+ 1 to +5 -1.37 0. 35 -2.55** 
-5 to +5 0.69 • 0. 50 0. 75 
-10 to + 10 -1. 12 0. 45 -0. 73 
* Significant at the one percent level. 
** Significant at the five percent level. 
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Table 6.2 
Average prediction errors for various days and intervals around the 
announcement of asset-for-stock exchanges for the sample of one- 
hundred-seven acquirers. 
Panel A: Daily average and cumulative prediction errors 
DAY PE CPE t-statistic 
-10 -0.33% -0.33% -0. 94 
-9 -0. 32 -0. 66 -0. 92 
-8 -0. 22 -0. 88 -0. 63 
-7 0. 08 -0. 79 0. 24 
-6 -0. 08 -0. 87 -0. 22 
-5 0. 17 -0. 70 0. 49 
-4 0. 50 -0. 20 1.42 
-3 0. 68 0. 48 1.95*** 
-2 0. 82 1.29 2.37** 
-1 1. 15 2. 44 3.44* 
0 0. 32 2. 76 0. 89 
1 0. 40 3. 16 1. 14 
2 -0. 54 2. 62 -1.55 
3 -0. 01 2. 60 -0. 03 
4 -0. 14 2. 47 -0. 39 
5 0. 23 2. 70 0. 66 
6 0. 05 2. 75 0. 13 
7 -0. 11 2.64 -0. 30 
8 0. 25 2. 89 0. 70 
9 -0. 43 2. 46 -1.22 
10 -0. 22 2. 24 -0. 62 
Panel B: Mean cumulative prediction errors (in percent), proportion 
of positive returns and the z-statistic over various 







-50 to 0 4. 42 0. 57 3. 04* 
-10 to 0 2. 76 0. 63 3. 69* 
-5 to 0 3. 63 0. 64 6. 62* 
-2 to 0 2.29 0. 59 6.03* 
-1 to 0 1.47 0. 54 5. 44* 
+ 1 to +5 -0. 06 0. 45 0. 56 
-5 to +5 3. 57- 0. 61 5.27* 
-10 to + 10 2. 24 0. 59 3. 08* 
* Significant at the one percent level. 
** Significant at the five percent level 
*** Significant at the ten percent level. 
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Table 6.3 
Dollar abnormal returns to divestors and acquirers in asset-for- 
stock exchanges for different intervals around the announcement 
date. All dollar returns are in millions. 
Panel A: Dollar abnormal returns 
Interval Divestors Acquirers 
n= 93 n= 102 
Dollar Number Dollar Number 
CPE Positive CPE Positive 









i 43 39. 1 56 
-10 to 0 1.0 48 34. 7 61** *** 
-5 to 0 30. 6 58** 32. 9 61* 
-2 to 0 40. 8 59** 23. 5 59 
-1 to 0 31.7 56** 20. 8 55 
-1 20. 3 59** 13. 1 54 
0 11.4 42 7.6 51 
+ 1 -7. 7 32** 9.8 52 
+ 1 to +5 -26. 4 32* 16. 4 45 
-5 to +5 4. 3 45 49. 2 62** 
-10 to + 10 -56. 3 41 43. 3 57*#* 
Panel B :Dollar value of Equity (millions) 
Mean 2332 992 
Median 634 235 
* Significant at the one percent level. 
** Significant at the five percent level 
*** Significant at the ten percent level. 
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Table 6.4 
Average prediction errors for various intervals around the 
announcement date for a value-weighted portfolio of sixty-eight 
matched pairs of divestors and acquirers in asset-for-stock 
exchanges. Weights were in proportion to the dollar equity value six 
days prior to day 0. 
Panel A: Daily average and cumulative prediction errors 
DAY PE CPE t-statistic 
-5 0. 18% -0.77% 0. 82 
-4 0. 42 -0. 35 1.98*** 
-3 0. 01 -0. 34 0. 06 
-2 0. 24 -0. 10 1. 13 
-1 0. 79 0. 69 3. 96* 
0 0. 17 0. 86 0. 78 
1 -0. 29 0. 57 -1.36 
2 -0. 26 0. 30 -1.22 
3 -0. 28 0. 02 -1.31 
4 0. 04 0. 06 0. 20 
5 -0. 01 0. 05 -0. 06 
Panel B: Mean cumulative prediction errors (in percent) for various 
intervals around the announcement date and z-statistic for 
portfolios of matched pairs of firms undertaking an asset- 
for-stock exchange. 
Interval CPE z-statistic 
-5 to 0 1.81% 3.64* 
-2 to 0 1.20 3. 40* 
-1 to 0 0. 96 3. 11* 
+ 1 to +5 -0. 81 -0. 86 
* Significant at 
** Significant at 
*** Significant at 
the one percent level, 
the five percent level 
the ten percent level. 
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Table 6.5 
Frequency distribution of positive and negative cumulative 
prediction errors for divestors and acquirers in sixty-eight matched 
pairs of firms carrying out asset-for-stock exchanges. 




-50 to 0 20 14 10 24 
-5 to 0 28 10 15 15 
-2 to 0 28 9 18 13 
-1 to 0 25 10 16 17 
-1 21 11 22 14 
0 15 21 12 20 
+1 to +5 14 23 9 22 
-5 to +5 23 14 11 20 
-10 to +10 21 16 12 19 
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Table 6.6 
Comparison of returns to acquirers on whose board the divestor 
did/did not appoint directors in an asset-for-stock exchange. Mean 
cumulative prediction errors, proportion of positive returns and 
test statistic over various intervals around the announcement date. 
Directors Appointed 
n=21 
Directors not Appointed 
n=86 
Interval CPE Proportion z CPE Proportion z 
(%) positive (%) positive 
-50 to 0 3. 15% 0. 48 1.46 4. 74% 0. 59 2.67* 
-10 to 0 3. 52 0. 57a 2.33** *** 2. 57 0. 64 2.96* 
-5 to 0 4. 06 0. 57a 3. 35* 3. 53 0. 66 5.73* 
-2 to 0 4. 76 0. 57a 5. 34* 1.68 0. 59 4. 09* 
-1 to 0 3. 68 0. 57a 5. 46* 0. 93 0. 53 3.36* 
-1 3. 51 0. 62a 7. 29* 0. 58 0. 51 2.28** 
0 0. 17 0. 48 0. 44 0. 35 0. 50 2.47** 
+ 1 0. 41 0. 48 0. 92 0. 29 0. 51 1.08 
+ 1 to +5 -1.20 0. 33 -0. 59 0. 21 0. 48 0. 92 
-5 to +5 2. 85 0. 62 2.07**a 3. 74 0. 60 4.85* 
-10 to + 10 -0. 59 0. 48 0. 47 3. 03 0. 62 3. 21* 
a These would not be significant if the Binomial Sign Test is used 
to test the hypothesis that the proportion of positive and 
negative returns are equal. 
* Significant at the one percent level. 
** Significant at the five percent level. 
*** Significant at the ten percent level. 
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Table 6.7 
Comparison of returns to divestors that did/did not appoint 
directors on the board of the acquirer in an asset-for-stock 
exchange. Mean cumulative prediction errors, proportion of positive 




Did Not Appoint Directors 
n=74 
Interval CPE Proportion z CPE Proportion z 
(%) positive (%) positive 
-50 to 0 1. 19% 0. 57 -0. 39 -0.46% 0. 49 0. 40 
-10 to 0 1.78 0. 52 0. 98 0. 74 0. 54 0. 96 
-5 to 0 2. 86 0. 67 2.04** 1.82 0. 61 2.69* 
-2 to 0 3. 24 0. 71 3. 08* 0. 74 0. 61 2.05** 
-1 to 0 2.70 0. 71a 2. 98* 0. 56 0. 57 2.23** 
-1 2. 01 0. 67 3. 57* 0. 89 0. 64 3.86* 
0 0. 69 0. 52 0. 64 -0. 33 0. 42 -0.70 
+ 1 0. 25 0. 43 0. 69 -0. 52 0. 34 -2.31** 
+ 1 to +5 -0. 83 0. 38 -0. 58 -1.54 0. 34 -2.57* 
-5 to +5 2.04 0. 52 1. 11 0. 28 0. 49 0.25 
-10 to +10 -0. 17 0. 48 -0. 02 -1.33 0. 45 -0. 82 
a Significant at the ten percent level using Binomial Sign Test. 
* Significant at the one percent level. 
** Significant at the five percent level. 
*** Significant at the ten percent level. 
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Table 6.8 
Comparison of acquirers that gave convertible securities as 
consideration for the asset with those that gave straight stock as 
consideration in an asset-for-stock exchange. Mean cumulative 
prediction errors, proportion of positive returns and test statistic 





Interval CPE Proportion z CPE Proportion z 
(%) positive (%) positive 
-50 to 0 3. 60% 0. 63 1.36 4. 61% 0. 56 2. 73* 
-10 to 0 2. 26 0. 63 1.28 2. 87 0. 63 3. 48* 
-5 to 0 2. 86 0. 63 2.45** 3. 80 0. 65 6. 16* 
-2 to 0 0. 80 0. 53 1.31 2. 60 0. 60 6.04* 
-1 to 0 0. 19 0. 47 0. 89 1.74 0. 56 5. 58* 
-1 0. 15 0. 37 1.40 1.37 0. 57 5. 17* 
0 0. 04 0. 53 -0. 14 0. 38 0. 49 2. 73* 
+ 1 1. 16 0. 58 1.63 0. 13 0. 49 0. 76 
+ 1 to +5 1. 11 0. 63 0. 66 -0. 32 0. 41 0. 31 
-5 to +5 3. 97 0. 58 2.25** 3. 48 0. 61 4.76* 
-10 to + 10 5. 14 0. 63 1 90*** 1.72 0. 58 2.52** 
* Significant at the one percent level. 
** Significant at the five percent level 
*** Significant at the ten percent level. 
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Table 6.9 
Comparison of divestors that got straight stock with those that got 
convertible securities in asset-for-stock exchanges. Mean cumulative 
prediction errors, proportion of positive returns and test statistic 





Interval CPE Proportion z CPE Proportion z 
(%) positive (%) positive 
-50 to 0 0. 69% 0. 55 0. 66 -0.33% 0. 49 -0. 17 
-10 to 0 -0. 45 0. 50 0. 36 1.39 0. 55 1.30 
-5 to 0 1.93 0. 68 1.60 2. 09 0. 60 2. 93* 
-2 to 0 1.30 0. 68 1.84*** 1.29 0. 62 2.71* 
-1 to 0 1.49 0. 59 2.32** 0. 89 0. 60 2.57* 
-1 1.09 0. 64 2.24** 1. 16 0.64 4. 57* 
0 0. 40 0. 50 1.04 -0. 26 0. 42 -0.93 
+ 1 -0. 22 0. 27 -1.25 -0. 39 0. 38 -1.26 
+ 1 to +5 -2. 55 0. 23 -1.90*** -1.03 0.38 -1.86*** 
-5 to +5 -0.61 0. 59 -0. 10 1.06 0. 47 0. 91 
-10 to + 10 -4. 19 0. 36 -0. 95 -0. 14 0. 48 -0. 32 
* Significant at the one percent level. 
** Significant at the five percent level 
*** Significant at the ten percent level. 
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Table 6.10 
Comparison of divestors that got restricted stock with those getting 
non-restricted stock in the acquirer in an asset-for-stock exchange. 
Mean cumulative prediction errors, proportion of positive returns 






Interval CPE Proportion z CPE Proportion z 
(%) positive (%) positive 
-50 to 0 1.97% 0. 53 0. 05 -0.48% 0. 50 0. 16 
-10 to 0 5. 03 0. 67 2.01** 0. 21 0. 51 0. 56 
-5 to 0 5. 32 0. 73 3. 18* 1.44 0. 60 2.26** 
-2 to 0 5. 90 0. 80a 5. 11* 0. 43 0. 60 1.34 
-1 to 0 4. 43 0. 73b 4. 75* 0. 40 0. 58 1.62 
-1 3. 26 0. 67 4. 82* 0. 74 0. 64 3. 45* 
0 1. 17 0. 53 1.90*** -0. 35 0. 43 -1. 16 
+ 1 0. 03 0. 47 0. 69 -0. 42 0. 34 -2.16** 
+ 1 to +5 -0. 82 0. 33 -0. 72 -1.49 0. 35 -2.46** 
-5 to +5 4. 49 0. 67 1.86*** -0. 05 0. 46 0.01 
-10 to + 10 1.80 0. 60 0. 41 -1.61 0. 43 -0. 98 
a Significant at the 3.6% level using a Binomial Sign Rank Test 
for the hypothesis that the proportion of positive and negative 
abnormal returns are equal. 
b Significant at the 11.8% level using a Binomial Sign Rank Test 
for the hypothesis that the proportion of positive and negative 
abnormal returns are equal. 
* Significant at the one percent level. 
** Significant at the five percent level. 
*** Significant at the ten percent level. 
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Table 6.11 
Comparison of acquirers that placed restrictions on the stock given 
as consideration in an asset-for-stock exchange with those that did 
not place any restrictions. Mean cumulative prediction errors, 
proportion of positive returns and test statistic over various 






Interval CPE Proportion z CPE Proportion z 
(%) positive (%) positive 
-50 to 0 2. 50% 0. 53 0. 08 4. 79% 0. 58 3.28* 
-10 to 0 0. 47 0. 47 -0. 82 3. 19 0. 66 4.38* 
-5 to 0 0. 69 0. 65 -0. 64 4. 19 0. 64 7. 49* 
-2 to 0 -0. 09 0. 47 -1.62 2. 73 0. 61 7.28* 
-1 to 0 -1.59 0. 41 -3.67* 2.04 0. 57 7.52* 
-1 -1. 16 0. 41 -3.25* 1.59 0. 56 7. 16* 
0 -0. 43 0. 24 -1 94*** 0. 46 0. 54 3. 47* 
+ 1 0. 42 0. 53 1.86*** 0. 29 0. 50 0.70 
+ 1 to +5 -0. 20 0. 41 0. 41 -0. 04 0. 46 0. 43 
-5 to +5 0. 49 0. 47 -0. 19 4. 15 0. 63 5. 83* 
-10 to + 10 -1.40 0. 41 -0. 86 3. 03 0. 62 3. 74 
* Significant at the one percent level. 
** Significant at the five percent level 
*** Significant at the ten percent level. 
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Table 6.12 
Comparison of divestors that got some cash along with stock in an 
asset-for-stock exchange with those that got only stock. Mean 
cumulative prediction errors, proportion of positive returns and 
test statistic over various intervals around the announcement date. 
Cash No Cash 
n=44 n=51 
Interval CPE Proportion z CPE Proportion z 
(%) positive (%) positive 
-50 to 0 -2.36% 0. 43 -0. 58 1.86% 0. 57 0. 76 
-10 to 0 1.78 0. 52 1.30 0. 26 0. 55 0. 59 
-5 to 0 2. 79 0. 61 2.84* 1.42 0. 63 1.91** *** 
-2 to 0 2. 57 0. 66 3. 54* 0. 19 0. 61 1. 16 
-1 to 0 2. 26 0. 64 3. 93* -0. 03 0. 57 0. 96 
-1 2. 19 0. 64 5. 84* 0. 23 0. 65 1.51 
0 0. 07 0. 41 -0. 29 -0. 26 0. 47 -0. 16 
+ 1 -0. 90 0. 32 -3.19* 0. 12 0. 39 0. 62 
+ 1 to +5 -1.70 0. 36 -2.46** -1. 11 0. 33 -1. 19 
-5 to +5 1.09 0. 50 0. 44 0. 31 0. 49 0. 61 
-10 to + 10 0. 05 0. 41 -0. 34 -2. 04 0. 49 -0.69 
* Significant at the one percent level. 
** Significant at the five percent level 
*** Significant at the ten percent level. 
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Table 6.13 
Comparison of acquirers that gave some cash along with stock in an 
asset-for-stock exchange with those that gave only stock. Mean 
cumulative prediction errors, proportion of positive returns and 














-50 to 0 4. 45% 0. 53 2.28** 4. 40% 0.61 2.03** 
-10 to 0 1.43 0. 59 \ 97#** 3. 97 0. 66 3.22* 
-5 to 0 2. 93 0. 63 4. 31* 4. 27 0. 66 5. 03* 
-2 to 0 2. 19 0. 51 5. 05* 2. 37 0. 66 3.52* 
-1 to 0 1.92 0. 53 6. 05* 1.05 0. 55 \ 74*** 
-1 1.57 0. 57 5. 85* 0. 77 0. 50 1.71*** 
0 0. 35 0. 43 2. 71* 0. 28 0. 55 0. 75 
+ 1 0. 23 0. 53 0. 77 0. 39 0. 48 1. 17 
+ 1 to +5 -0. 35 0. 41 -0. 05 0. 20 0. 48 0. 82 
-5 to +5 2. 58 0. 55 3. 15* 4. 47 0. 66 4. 27* 
-10 to + 10 1.85 0. 51 2.07** 2. 76 0. 66 2.29** 
* Significant at the one percent level. 
** Significant at the five percent level 
*** Significant at the ten percent level. 
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Table 6.14 
Comparison of divestors in asset-for-stock exchanges for whom more 
than fifty percent of the consideration was stock in the acquirer 
with those for whom more than fifty percent of the consideration was 
cash or other securities. Mean cumulative prediction errors, 
proportion of positive returns and test statistic over various 











-50 to 0 -2.45% 0. 45 -1.09 2. 69% 0. 55 1.46 
-10 to 0 1. 15 0. 53 1.07 0. 62 0. 50 0. 66 
-5 to 0 2. 66 0. 64 3.08* 1.29 0. 60 1.47 
-2 to 0 1.59 0. 64 2. 69* 0. 72 0. 62 1.53 
-1 to 0 1.87 0. 60 3. 50* -0. 12 0. 60 0. 80 
-1 1. 11 0.66 3. 63* 1.34 0. 64 3.80* 
0 0. 76 0. 47 1.32 -1.46 0. 38 -2.67* 
+1 -0. 16 0.38 -0. 34 -0. 61 0. 31 -2.28** *** 
+ 1 to +5 -0. 93 0. 34 -1.22 -1.97 0. 36 -2.62* 
-5 to +5 1.73 0. 55 1.45 -0. 68 0. 43 -0. 68 
-10 to +10 -0. 38 0. 51 -0. 01 -2. 10 0. 38 -1.26 
* Significant at the one percent level. 
** Significant at the five percent level 
*** Significant at the ten percent level. 
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Table 6.15 
Comparison of acquirers that purchased loss making divisions in an 
asset-for-stock exchange with those that acquired non-loss making 
units. Mean cumulative prediction errors, proportion of positive 
returns and test statistic over various intervals around the 
announcement date. 
Loss Making Division 
n=16 
Non-Loss Making Division 
n=91 
Interval CPE Proportion z CPE Proportion z 
(%) positive (%) positive 
-50 to 0 1. 13% 0. 56 0. 29 5. 01% 0. 57 3. 18* 
-10 to 0 3. 73 0. 69 1.66** ***  2.59 0. 62 3. 31* 
-5 to 0 4. 65 0. 69 3. 05* 3. 45 0. 64 5. 90* 
-2 to 0 2. 07 0. 50 2.42** 2. 32 0. 60 5.52* 
-1 to 0 1. 12 0. 50 2.41** 1.53 0. 55 4. 89* 
-1 1.47 0. 63 2. 69* 1. 10 0. 52 4. 59* 
0 -0. 34 0. 31 0. 71 0. 43 0. 53 2.32** 
+ 1 -0. 22 0. 44 1. 10 0. 40 0. 52 1.03 
+ 1 to +5 -0. 98 0. 38 -0. 03 0. 10 0. 46 0. 62 
-5 to +5 3. 68 0. 63 2.23** 3. 55 0. 60 4.78* 
-10 to + 10 0. 75 0. 63 0. 62 2. 60 0. 58 3.08* 
* Significant at the one percent level. 
** Significant at the five percent level 
*** Significant at the ten percent level. 
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Table 6.16 
Comparison of divestors that sold loss making divisions with those 
divesting non-loss making divisions in asset-for-stock exchanges. 
Mean cumulative prediction errors, proportion of positive returns 
and test statistic over various intervals around the announcement 
date. 
Loss Making Division 
n=13 
Non-Loss Making Division 
n=82 
Interval CPE Proportion z Proportion z 
(%) positive (%) positive 
-50 to 0 5. 53% 1 0.62 1.46 -0.99% 0. 49 -0. 40 
-10 to 0 1. 13 0. 54 0. 36 0. 94 0. 54 1.27 
-5 to 0 2. 38 0. 69 1.56 2. 00 0. 61 2. 97* 
-2 to 0 1.90 0. 69 2.16** 1.20 0. 62 2. 65* 
-1 to 0 1.57 0. 54 1.72*** 0. 95 0. 61 2. 94* 
-1 1.64 0. 69 2.02** 1.06 0. 63 4. 67* 
0 -0.08 0. 46 0. 42 -0. 11 0. 44 -0. 50 
+ 1 -1.45 0. 23 -2.77* -0. 18 0. 38 -0.74 
+ 1 to +5 -1.34 0. 31 -1.56 -1.39 0. 35 -2.12** 
-5 to +5 1.05 0. 46 0. 11 0. 61 0. 50 0.76 
-10 to + 10 -3. 40 0. 46 -1.57 -0. 71 0.45 -0. 17 
* Significant at the one percent level. 
** Significant at the five percent level 
*** Significant at the ten percent level. 
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Table 6.17 
Returns to divestors and acquirers at different levels of stock 
acquired in asset-for-stock exchanges. 
x= Percentage of stock acquired 





















 < 25 0. 6 -1.4 67 1. 1 -0. 1 80 
5== X < 20 1.0 -1.4 28 1.6 -0. 5 35 
5< x < 25 0. 6 -1.3 42 1.9 0. 0 47 
20< x < 50 1.5 -1.5 31 1. 1 1.9 28 
5< x < 50 1.3 -1.4 59 1.4 0. 6 63 
25< x < 50 3. 1 -1.9 17 -0. 3 2. 3 16 
50< x 0.7 -0. 5 11 4. 6 0.7 11 
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Table 6.18 
Results for regression of returns on the percentage of stock 
acquired in asset-for-stock exchanges. Figures in parentheses give 
the t-statistics. 
STPER= Percentage of Stock acquired 
Regression: RETURN= a + /3 • STPER 
a £ N F 
Divestors 




80 0. 169 
(0.68) 
Days -1,0 0. 04 
(0.03) 
3. 17 80 0. 489 
(0.48) 
Acquirers 
Day -1 -0. 47 7. 76 96 6. 063 
( -0.50) (2.46)** (0.02) 




96 2. 34 
(0.13) 
** Significant at the five percent level. 
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Table 6.19 
Piecewise linear ordinary least square regressions of abnormal 
returns on percentage of stock acquired. Stockholding levels of 5% 
and 25% were used as the turning points. Figures in parentheses give 
the t-statistics, except in the case of the F-statistic. 
Return = aQ + • S1 + a2 • S2 + a3 • S3 
where S1 = Percentage of Stock Acquired if stock acquired < 0.05 
= 0. 05 if stock acquired 2: 0. 05; 
S2 = 0 if stock acquired < 0.05 
= stock acquired minus 0.05 if 0.05 ^ stock acquired < 0.25 
= 0.20 if percentage of stock acquired ^ 0.25; 
S3 = 0 if percentage of stock acquired < 0.25 
= stock acquired minus 0.25 if stock acquired ^ 0.25. 
Return = Abnormal return during a certain interval. 
Panel A: Divestors 
Variable Return on Days 































(continued on next page) 
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Table 6.19 (continued) 
Panel B: Acquirers 
Variable Return on Days 
-1 -1 -i,o 
Constant -0.015 
(-0.54) 






















N 96 97 96 






N= Number of observations. 
a Figures in parentheses give level of significance. 
* Significant at the one percent level. 
** Significant at the five percent level. 
*** Significant at the ten percent level. 
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Table 6. 20 
Piecewise linear ordinary least square regressions of abnormal 
returns on percentage of stock acquired. Stockholding levels of 20% 
and 50% were used as the turning points. Figures in parentheses give 
the t-statistics, except in the case of the F-statistic. 
Return = aQ + aa • S1 + a2 • S2 + a3 • S3 
where S1 = Percentage of Stock Acquired if stock acquired < 0.20 
= 0.20 if stock acquired 0.20; 
52 = 0 if stock acquired < 0.20 
= stock acquired minus 0.20 if 0.20 ^ stock acquired < 0.50 
= 0.45 if percentage of stock acquired ^ 0.50; 
53 = 0 if percentage of stock acquired < 0. 50 
= stock acquired minus 0.50 if stock acquired ^ 0.50. 
Return = Abnormal return during a certain interval. 
Panel A: Divestors 
Variable Return on Days 
-1 -1 -i,o -1,0 





























N 80 81 80 81 
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Table 6.20 (continued) 
Panel B: Acquirers 
Variable Return on Days 






























N 96 97 96 97 








N= Number of observations 
a Figures in parentheses give level of significance 
* Significant at the one percent level. 
** Significant at the five percent level. 
*** Significant at the ten percent level. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS AND CONTRIBUTION 
7.1 Conclusions 
In this study we have examined sales of assets where the 
consideration for the divested asset is either a similar asset or 
some equity in the firm acquiring the asset. Since cash is not the 
primary consideration in asset exchanges, they are more suitable for 
examining the role of synergies in the divestiture decision than 
sale of assets for cash. An analysis of percentage abnormal returns, 
dollar abnormal returns and matched pairs of firms in each 
transaction is carried out. 
Firms undertaking asset-for-asset exchanges do not have 
significant gains or losses at announcement. Further, these firms 
have negative abnormal returns during the five-day period after the 
announcement. These negative returns are intriguing and are more 
pronounced for firms that obtain cash along with other operating 
assets. Firms that announce the value of the transaction also have 
negative abnormal returns in the post-announcement period. Along 
with the reversal in signs of returns between days -1 and 0, these 
might suggest the existence of information asymmetries in the 
market. The market is seemingly unable to completely evaluate the 
impact of the transaction in the absence of some indication about 
its value. However, this is inconsistent with the notion of 
efficient markets. We investigate the possibility that asset-for- 
asset exchanges lead to the substitution of assets with those having 
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a higher level of risk. By comparing shifts in betas between the 
pre- and post-event intervals, we find that the post-event negative 
abnormal returns are only present in the subsample of firms whose 
beta increases after an asset-for-asset exchange. In dollar value 
terms, the median firm’s loss in the post-event period is 
significant but less than 1% of the median firm’s equity value. 
A portfolio of matched pairs of firms has significant losses at 
announcement. Both firms gain only in a few pairs. These results 
suggest that overall asset-for-asset exchanges are not value 
enhancing transactions. Our results do not provide support for the 
argument that these exchanges are motivated by benefiting from 
synergistic gains. There is mild support for hypotheses relating to 
the existence of information effects and the possibility of changes 
in the riskiness driving the results. Since most asset-for-asset 
exchanges lead to concentration of operations within a geographic 
area, our results suggest that a mere geographic realignment of 
assets has no benefits. This does not lend support to the argument 
by firms that a geographic concentration will lead to gains from 
reduction in costs and other efficiencies. However, it is possible 
that this geographic concentration results in an increase in 
riskiness of the firm. 
Our evidence on asset-for-stock exchanges shows that on average 
both divestors and acquirers gain at the announcement of the 
transaction. The percentage abnormal results are higher for 
acquirers than for divestors. Since the divestors in our sample were 
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larger than acquirers, we also examined dollar gains to both sets of 
firms. The dollar gains to divestors and acquirers were similar in 
magnitude. However, as a percentage of the median firm’s equity 
value, the gains are higher for acquirers. Keeping in view the fact 
that the divested assets form only a part of the firm, the gains are 
comparable in magnitude to those of firms involved in takeovers. 
Gains to portfolios of matched pairs suggest that asset-for- 
stock exchanges are value enhancing transactions. However, the gains 
are shared by both firms in just over one-third of all transactions. 
Almost half the transactions are characterized by gains to only one 
firm, while both firms lose in the rest. 
Factors that might explain the gains to divestors and acquirers 
were also identified and examined. Since asset-for-stock exchanges 
result in acquisition of partial control by the divestor, the means 
and extent of exercising this control are important determinants of 
gain sharing. 
Appointment of directors on the acquirer’s board is one way in 
which this control can be exercised. This might also indicate the 
possibility of a complete takeover in the future. Appointment of 
directors leads to higher gains to both divestors and acquirers. 
Among divestors, the post-announcement period negative abnormal 
returns are significant only for those not appointing directors on 
the acquirer’s board. On an average, divestors appointing directors 
acquired a higher percentage of stock. 
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Our findings also suggest that abnormal returns to acquirers 
rise as the percentage of stock acquired increases to 20%, fall as 
the stock acquired rises further to 50%, and continue to rise as the 
level of stock acquired increases over 50%. A positive relationship 
is noticed for divestors when the stock acquired rises to 20%. 
Divestors do not benefit from acquiring additional stock beyond this 
level. The results for acquirers bear similarity to Wruck’s findings 
on private equity placements. Combined with the other findings, 
these results also suggest that acquirers gain from a passing over 
of control to the divestor. The lower returns to divestors at high 
levels of stock acquired are similar to the pattern found for 
bidders in takeovers. 
Convertible securities are sometimes used as consideration 
instead of straight stock. As expected, the use of straight stock 
leads to higher returns to acquirers, reinforcing the argument that 
gains to acquirers are related to the transfer of control. On the 
other hand, gains to divestors do not differ if convertible 
securities are the consideration instead of straight stock. 
Acquirers placing restrictions on voting rights of stock or 
imposing standstill agreements have negative abnormal returns during 
the announcement period, while those not placing any restrictions 
gain during the same period. Divestors getting restricted stock have 
higher abnormal returns during the announcement period and non¬ 
significant negative returns in the post-announcement period. In 
contrast, divestors that get non-restricted stock have significant 
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losses in the post-announcement period. In fact, for this subset of 
divestors all the gains at announcement are wiped out in the post¬ 
announcement period. This also points to the negative impact of 
obtaining stock and partial control for divestors. 
Obtaining cash along with stock leads to higher returns for 
divestors. This subsample also has a lower and significant negative 
abnormal return in the post-event period. On the other hand, 
acquirers paying mainly in cash have higher returns than those 
making primarily a stock payment. One interpretation of these 
results is that obtaining cash is viewed negatively by the market 
for divestors, but in the case of acquirers a stock payment may 
signal overvaluation. 
The influence of the quality of assets divested was investigated 
by separately examining sales of loss making units. Divesting loss 
making units leads to lower abnormal returns than divesting 
profitable units. It is possible that the decision to divest is 
viewed positively by the market but retention of interest in the 
acquirer of the loss making unit is viewed negatively. While both 
groups of divestors lose in the post-announcement period, the losses 
are significant only for those divesting non-loss making units. 
Gains are higher for firms acquiring non-loss making units in asset- 
for-stock exchanges. 
Overall, our findings suggest that asset exchanges and 
divestitures are not driven solely by synergistic considerations. 
Some of our evidence points to the valuation effects of cash being a 
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part of the consideration. The impact of several other factors that 
are examined helps explain the pattern of returns to divestors and 
acquirers. 
7.2 Contribution 
We examine two restructuring transactions that have not been 
studied in the past. While a number of studies have focused on the 
valuation impact of divestitures, the support for synergies being 
the only motive is less than convincing. The impact of some other 
motives like the need for liquidity, distress sales and defensive 
considerations has not been examined separately, although the 
popular business literature points to their importance. 
Since cash is not the primary consideration in asset exchanges, 
our results provide a cleaner test for synergy being a motive in 
divestitures. Another advantage of looking at asset exchanges is 
their tax-free nature, though we are unable to verify the tax status 
of each transaction. Our results suggest that although synergistic 
considerations play an important role, other factors are also 
important in explaining the valuation effects in divestitures. 
While a number of studies have examined the influence of the 
form of consideration in takeovers, ours is the first study that 
provides evidence on the influence of the medium of payment in 
divestitures. We focus on non-monetary forms of consideration and 
find differences in their valuation impacts. Asset-for-stock 
exchanges can also be viewed as creating a new form of organization 
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and can be used to form alliances without bearing some of the 
disadvantages of mergers or joint ventures. 
The use of matched pairs is an extension to the existing 
literature on divestitures. In our view, this is a more appropriate 
methodology to measure the gains from divestitures than examining 
returns to acquirers and divestors separately. 
Overall, while we examine specific forms of divestitures, on a 
broader level, this study adds to the body of knowledge on corporate 
restructuring. It also suggests further avenues of investigation. 
7.3 Extensions 
While we have established the valuation impacts and identified 
some factors that explain gains or losses to firms undertaking asset 
exchanges, further analysis to isolate characteristics of 
transactions in which both firms gain/lose or only one firm gains is 
required. One factor that could explain the differences between 
valuation impacts for firms in asset-for-asset exchanges is the 
Tobin’s Q for these firms. 
An analysis of the long-term performance of firms undertaking 
asset exchanges will provide a better understanding of the gains 
from these transactions. We also need a better understanding of the 
stability of the organizational form created as a result of an 
asset-for-stock exchange. Does this partially merged form continue? 
Do the divestors fully acquire the other firm, or do they sell the 
stock to a third party? 
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An obvious extension is to carry out an analysis of returns to 
matched pairs of firms in sales of assets for cash. While we know 
that sales of assets for cash lead to gains to sellers and small 
gains to buyers, we do not have a complete understanding of how 
these gains are split between the two firms. 
Two interesting forms of divestitures that still need to be 
studied are exchanges of assets in return for a firm’s own stock and 
those involving a reduction in debt as the consideration for the 
divested asset. Divesting assets to reduce indebtedness is an 
interesting transaction from the agency perspective. Why does the 
firm not sell the assets for cash and use the proceeds to reduce 
debt? This is an interesting but currently unanswered issue. If this 
exchange has an advantage over selling for cash, it should lead to 
higher returns to stockholders. In this transaction one group of 
debt holders is paid off in the form of income earning assets. This 
exchange has the effect of collateral being taken away from non¬ 
participating bondholders and is expected to result in a transfer of 
wealth from non-participating bondholders to those participating in 
the exchange. 
The extensions to this study are indicative of the evolving 
state of knowledge relating to restructuring and changes in 
industrial organization. The work in this dissertation has addressed 
previously unanswered aspects of restructuring and the investigation 




A NOTE ON THE TAX AND ACCOUNTING IMPLICATIONS OF ASSET EXCHANGES 
Section 1031 of the tax code deals with ‘exchange of property 
held for productive use or investment’. If the exchange is solely in 
kind, then no gain or loss is realized, if such property is 
exchanged for property of like kind which is to be held either for 
productive use in a trade or business or for investment. 
An exchange of assets that are of the same general type, perform 
the same function, or are employed in the same line of business is 
tax-free, if the exchange is solely in kind. This includes swaps of: 
1. Identical productive assets, e.g., an exchange of oil tankers 
between two shipping firms. 
2. Operations in the same line of business, e.g., radio 
stations. 
3. An asset or operation for 20% or greater equity interest in 
another company in the same line of business, e.g., the sale 
of an insurance subsidiary for a 20% interest in another 
insurance company. 
The basis carried over is usually based on the book value of the 
asset or operation exchanged. The property received acquires the 
basis of the property surrendered reduced by money received or 
liabilities assumed by the transferee. An adjustment is made in case 
of gains or losses. The fact that no gain or loss is recognized is 
based on the theory that such exchanges do not result in culmination 
of the earnings process. 
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If cash or other monetary consideration is involved, the 
recipient will recognize a gain if monetary receipts exceed a 
proportionate share of the book value of the traded asset. The 
realized gain is the excess of amount received in the exchange over 
the adjusted basis of the property transferred. When the book value 
exceeds the fair value of the consideration, a loss is recorded. 
For tax purposes, a taxable gain would be recognized for any 
money received (including a net reduction of liabilities) or any 
property that is not of a similar nature. A loss cannot be 
recognized for tax purposes. So the accounting loss would result in 
a deferred tax benefit that would be realized when the assets are 
sold or depreciated. It is also possible that the exchange is tax- 
free to one party and not to the other. 
Sale of property followed by purchase of like kind property from 
the same party would be treated as an exchange, despite 
documentation treating the transaction as an unrelated sale and 
purchase, where the circumstances indicate that the transactions 
were to be reciprocal and mutually dependent. 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 enhances the attractiveness of 
Section 1031 exchanges due to phasing out of the lower tax on 
capital gains. As a result of stretching out the period for 
depreciation, it becomes less of a factor in considering an 
exchange. 
The exchange of an operation for an equity interest in another 
company can be accomplished on a tax-free basis by the firm 
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divesting assets under Section 361, regardless of whether the 
receiving company is in the same line of business. This stock may be 
newly issued or treasury stock. Cash or any other property received 
in an asset-for-stock exchange is generally taxed as a capital gain, 
unless it is distributed to the shareholders. 
Since no gain or loss is recognized in this transfer, no step up 
in basis is permitted and the transferers basis and holding period 
are carried over. Prior to the 1986 Tax Act, Section 361(a) required 
the divestor to recognize a gain, which permitted the acquiring 
corporation to step up the basis of the property by an amount equal 
to the recognized gain. No loss is recognized. Under Section 1032, a 
corporation receiving assets in exchange for its own stock does not 
recognize a taxable gain or a deductible loss. 
The law on exchange of assets for own stock has been changed 
recently. In 1988 the U.S. Tax Court ruled that Esmark’s 1980 swap 
disposition of Vickers Energy Corp. to Mobil qualified as a tax-free 
deal. The IRS appealed this decision, and the law now clearly states 
that a corporation that transfers appreciated property (including 
stock of a subsidiary) to a shareholder in exchange for its own 
stock is taxed on the appreciation. 
Section 108 covers situations in which there is a non-gratuitous 
discharge of indebtedness. For bankrupt and insolvent corporations 
any income arising from this transaction is not included in gross 
income, but for firms outside bankruptcy such income is includable. 
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